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Executive Summary  
Queensland farmers are subject to highly variable climatic conditions, including drought 
and floods, which can undermine production. Insurance could play an important role in 
helping Queensland farmers manage their climate risk. However, currently the use of 
insurance to manage climate related production risk is poorly understood and utilised by 
farmers. This project aims to address this gap by providing information on climate risks 
and the role of insurance for managing these.  
This project conducted focussed reviews on climate risk in agriculture and on how 
insurance products could be used to address these risks. The project also carried out on-
ground surveys from cotton and sugar industry and conducted modelling to assess risks 
and the role of insurance for cotton and sugar cane farmers in Queensland. Prototype 
climate assessment risk and reporting tools were also developed.  
The reviews carried out in this project identified that Queensland’s agricultural sector is 
highly exposed to production volatility as a result of weather risks. It is our view that the 
Queensland agricultural sector has an excellent opportunity to provide its farmers with 
protection against uninsured seasonal risks to crop production. 
Key climate and farming systems risks were identified by interviewing a total of 55 
farmers (23 cotton growers and 32 sugar cane growers) across Queensland.  Key climate 
risks to the cotton industry include hail, drought/dry years (lack of rainfall during 
planting and season), quality downgrade (discolouration), excessive heat, floods and wet 
weather (during season and especially during harvest). Similarly, for the sugar industry, 
key climate risks include, drought, flood, excessive rainfall during harvest, cyclone, pests 
and disease. Key messages from farmer surveys are that current insurance products 
available to Queensland farmers (specifically, cotton and sugar cane farmers) may not 
address critical risks to the production and/or profitability of these systems and that 
farmers would prefer to have comprehensive insurance products available that cover 
them against profitability losses across multiple risk factors.   
A ‘climate and agricultural risk assessment and reporting tool’ (prototype) was developed 
as part of the project. This ‘tool’ allows quantification of key climate risks, initially for the 
sugar and cotton industry. The tool provides an option to generate a detail climate risk 
report based on historical data and a future seasonal climate forecast for an individual 
location. The tool data also serves as a dataset portal, allowing for the download of data 
in a required template. 
Cotton and sugarcane crop models APSIM and DSSAT were employed to simulate the 
growth and yield for 10 and 12 sites, respectively, across Queensland over the period 
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1940-2017 for various crop management factors. Comparing the simulated yields (from 
each model or the mean simulated value from ensemble models) to the observed yield 
(available at regional scale) the trend in year to year variability is satisfactorily captured 
for cotton on average, whereas for sugarcane there is a trend to overestimate or 
underestimate the yield depending on the site. 
Based on survey findings three prototype insurance products were developed for the 
cotton industry Insurance products developed were Drought Cover: insufficient rainfall 
during the planting season – August to November; Drought Cover: insufficient rainfall 
during growing season – November to February; and Wet Harvest Cover: excessive 
rainfall during harvest season – March to June 
Two prototype insurance products were developed for sugar industry. They include; 
Cyclone Cover: crop damage during cyclone season – November to April; and Wet 
Harvest Cover: excessive rainfall during harvest season – June to December 
Rainfall-indexed based worked examples were also developed for sugar and cotton 
industry growers to better appreciate the insurance mechanisms. 
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1. Introduction 
Australia is susceptible to volatile changes in temperature and precipitation, whilst also 
being the driest inhabited continent (Botterill & Hayes 2012; Parry et al. 2007). These 
changes have large implications for agricultural production, farm financial viability and 
the agricultural sector’s contribution to Australia’s economic stability (Webb 2006). 
Despite the extreme vulnerability of Australian agriculture, Australian farmers are some 
of the least protected in a globally competitive market. 
While several types of insurance products are currently available in Australia, they are 
not sufficiently comprehensive to address farmers’ concerns (NRAC 2012). Among the 
available options is the incorrectly named  ‘multi–peril crop insurance’ (MPCI) which is 
misleading as it only covers just a portion of risk (e.g. fire, frost, hail) but fails to cover 
certain events including drought, which is one of the most problematic of all risks faced 
by farmers. 
Given the nature of drought and other climate risks, and with the abandonment of 
Exceptional Circumstance (EC) grants in 2012, there is an urgent need to investigate 
options to establish a liquid and viable market for agricultural insurance in Queensland, 
and as well as in other Australia states. 
Agricultural insurance can assist farmers effectively manage the risks associated with 
extreme climate and weather events (Hatt et al. 2012). However, prior research 
concludes that currently available crops insurance is currently not commercially viable.  
Further, the demand for unsubsidised agricultural insurance products including index-
based and weather derivatives that have been introduced into the Australian market has 
been limited, causing problems with market liquidity and resulting in the withdrawal of 
many of these products (DAFWA 2009, Hatt et al. 2012, NRAC 2012).   
While there has been a policy trend led by government within Australian to wind back 
direct and ongoing industry assistance and protection, there may be a role for 
government to facilitate the development of a robust agricultural insurance market. 
Rather than by premium subsidy, this would most likely be through support for the 
provision of data collection, verification and supply systems needed to refine risk models 
and reduce information asymmetries.  The intended consequence of this would be to 
reduce the price of insurance and reinsurance.  
An identified issue that is consistent across all products introduced in Australia to date is 
access to independent and reliable information.  This data problem impacts re/insurance 
product design, pricing, administration and the ability to obtain reinsurance (NRAC 
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2012). Hatt et al. (2012) concludes there may be a case for government to facilitate the 
provision of the needed data and/or assist the development of new products.  Similarly, 
NRAC (2012) considers there is a role for government to assist farmers to become more 
self-sufficient through provision of information needed to enhance decision making and 
assist insurance product development. 
Aims and objectives 
The objectives of the proposed research are to investigate how re/insurance companies, 
agricultural industries and government can establish and maintain a liquid and viable 
market for agricultural insurance in Queensland, and Australia.  
The research involves:  
1. A focused review of current and potential data sources and models needed to 
facilitate the development of affordable and effective re/insurance products in Australia;  
2. Unravelling long-term climate data, their patterns and their mechanistic causes with 
linkage to crop modelling over the long-term (this aspect could be linked with other 
DCAP program activities; DCAP7.2 and DCAP14);  
3. Working closely with key insurance industry leaders (eg: Willis Towers Watson, 
Suncorp and Allianz, IAG, Latevo re/insurance companies) and investigate new 
re/insurance products that could be developed based on improved data and modelling, 
and considering affordability and market liquidity; and  
4. Consultation with re/insurance company representatives (e.g. Willis Towers Watson, 
Suncorp and Allianz, IAG and Latevo re/insurance companies re/insurance companies), 
farmers/farmers organisations (QFF, Growcom etc.), governments and other key 
stakeholders to ‘test out’ the potential insurance product innovations identified and 
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2. Literature review 
Introduction 
Australian agriculture operates under uncertain climatic and market conditions. Climate 
change is projected to increase the frequency of extreme weather events, including 
drought. Australian farmers must therefore not only constantly manage the risks of 
changing global market settings and volatile domestic growing conditions, including 
enhanced climate risks. The purpose of this review paper is to identify and evaluate 
options for managing the risks faced by Australian farmers against extreme climatic 
events. In our paper we look at three aspects of risk management. First, we look at 
farm-level management of risks. This is followed by market based solution such as multi-
peril crop insurance (MPCI), weather derivatives, yield index, and area yield insurance. 
This is followed by government initiatives designed to mitigate risk in Australian 
agriculture.  
The major feature of the natural environment that affects farming in Australia is rain 
during the growing season. Rain varies greatly from one year to the next, and thus the 
supply of water for irrigation from rain that runs off the land and into catchments and 
underground is limited and highly variable. The amount of rainfall also varies greatly 
across Australia. The monsoon areas of the tropical north have summer maximum 
rainfalls and the temperate south-west and south-east have winter maximum rainfall. 
Eighty per cent of the land receives less than 600 mm of rain per year, and 50% of the 
land receives less than 300 mm of rain each year. The dry centre receives less than 200 
mm of rain each year. South, between the dry centre and the coastal regions, annual 
rainfall is 200- 400 mm on average. Table 2-1 graphically presents the agricultural 
climate zones in Australia. 
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Figure 2-1 Agricultural climate zoning in Australia. Source: Hobbs and McIntyre (2005) 
One view is that the frequency and severity of droughts in Australia has increased due to 
climate change. Modelling done by IPCC (ARD models) shows that about 50% of the 
rainfall decrease in South Western Australia since the late 1960‟s is probably due to 
increases in greenhouse gases (Cai and Cowan, 2006). The historical record indicates 
that the percentage of area having exceptionally low rainfall between 2002-2007 is 
higher than the average of the last 16 and 108 years in all regions (Table 2-1). However, 
it also shows that the percentage area with exceptionally low rainfall in the last 16 years 
is lower than the average of the last 108 years, except for Victoria and Tasmania and 
Southwest WA.  
Table 2-1 Average percentage area having exceptionally low rainfall 
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The projection made by BOM and CSIRO in 2008 shows that the areal extent and 
frequency of exceptionally hot years has increased over recent decades and that this 
trend is expected to continue. The trend in exceptionally low rainfalls years is dependent 
on the period, but in some regions it is expected that the exceptionally low soil moisture 
years will increase over the next decades. 
Australian farmers face a high degree of production risk compared to other sectors of the 
economy as shown below in Figure 2. Since 1975, agriculture has exhibited the highest 
degree of volatility, at 3.1 times higher than the average sector. The volatility of the 
agriculture industry is nearly double that of any other industry. 
 
Figure 2-2 Industry output volatility, 1975–2011.Note: Industry volatility is calculated by taking the 
standard deviation of the percentage difference between actual and trend production. Trend data 
are estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott smoothing filter. Data are in chain volume measures. Data 
source: ABS 2011 
 
Since the majority of agricultural commodities are exported to international markets, 
output price risks are based mainly on the international price and exchange rate. 
Australia has a long history, until deregulation in recent decades, of using marketing 
boards for export and domestic marketing of major commodities. Marketing boards pool 
the price risk and usually offer a single price for all participating farmers. Under this type 
of scheme, the fluctuation of the international price and exchange rates are mitigated 
through the pooling mechanism, but farmers do not have access to other price risk 
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management instruments. Recent deregulations in commodity marketing arrangements 
have made it possible, and necessary, for farmers to manage price risk themselves. 
Within agriculture, there are substantial variations in the degrees of output volatility 
across products and regions. Grains and oilseeds exhibit the highest degree of volatility 
in the value of farm production, at 1.8 times the average as shown in Figure 2-3 below. 
 
 
Figure 2-3. Volatility of the value of Australian farm production, 1966–2011. Note: Industry 
volatility is calculated by taking the standard deviation of the percentage difference between 
actual and trend production. Trend data are estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott smoothing filter. 
When comparing indexes in this figure with those in Figure 1, note that the volatility index for the 
agricultural industry has been rebased to 1.0. Data source: ABARES 2011. 
Due to the climate characteristics of Australia, yield risk is generally the predominant 
source of risk in agriculture. Yield risk derives from the variability of seasonal weather 
conditions, especially rainfall prior to the start of the growing season for crops and 
pastures and spring rains, in the Mediterranean climate regions of south eastern and 
south western Australia and the temperate climate regions of eastern Australia. Other 
sources of yield risk includes natural disasters such as flood and bushfire, animal or plant 
disease outbreak, and hail and frost risk. Hail and frost may cause catastrophic damage 
to crops, but private insurance markets are well developed due to the less systemic 
nature of these risks.  
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For dryland farmers, weather and yield risks are foremost in their planning; the many 
other risks are significant but secondary. Farmers using irrigation face the risk of 
receiving highly variable and sometimes very low allocations of water for irrigation. 
Nguyen et al. (2005) provide empirical indicating that the most important risks perceived 
by land extensive farmers in SA and Queensland are climatic variability, followed by 
financial risk, 
Insurance products generally cover yield risk, as opposed to price risk, because options 
for farmers to hedge price risk, such as forward contracts and futures, already exist. By 
contrast, limited options are available for farmers to protect themselves from yield risk. 
In general it is easier for the market to provide options to hedge price risk rather than 
yield risk. First, because yield risks are less systemic than price risks, they can be 
localised and do not affect all farmers in the same way, meaning a higher degree of 
customisation is required for yield risk management options. Second, individual farmers 
can easily influence their own yield levels, meaning insurers need to determine whether 
a yield loss was caused by a trigger event, or sub-optimal management practices. This 
moral hazard problem is not an issue when dealing with price risk as price levels are 
virtually beyond the control of individual farmers. Finally, farmers generally have a 
better idea than insurers about their risks and expected yields. When this occurs, 
insurance companies are not able to distinguish between high risk and low risk farmers 
and price premiums accordingly. This adverse selection problem is not an issue in the 
context of market price movements as farmers do not have better information on price 
movements than the market as a whole.  
Agricultural insurance is more appropriate for rare and extreme events as shown in 
Figure 2-4. Claims made against insurance policies frequently add to the cost of 
insurance by increasing the costs of loss adjustment. The cost of insurance also needs to 
be considered against the cost of alternative risk management practices. In particular, 
less significant risks may be managed more economically through savings or borrowings. 
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Figure 2-4. The role of insurance. Source: DAFWA 2011 
 
Insurance cannot provide protection against events which are almost certain to occur, 
such as climate change. This is because insurance is not designed to be a subsidy to 
farmer income, but a tool that allows farmers to reduce downside risk. However, 
insurance can protect against climate variability, where a farm is profitable over the long 
term but exhibits an undesirable level of volatility on a year-by-year basis. 
Another significant characteristic of yield risk in Australia is its systemic nature. As 
shown in Figure 2-5 below, Australian farmers are exposed to much more systemic yield 
risk than farmers in three European countries because Australia suffers from catastrophic 
events, in particular drought, more frequently, which affects farms in many different 
locations simultaneously. In the European countries, yield risk is found to be more 
location/farm specific so that farmers face less systemic yield risk. 
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Figure 2-5 Correlation of yield across farms 
Price related risks are also perceived to be important in Australia where the majority of 
products are exported to international markets. Risks that derive from the export 
commodity markets that Australian farmers face include price volatility, exchange rate 
fluctuations and market access risk. Financial risk – the gearing ratios of farm firms – 
exacerbates the business risks of yield, price, disease and pest outbreaks. 
Figure 2-6 below presents the average price coefficient of variation for wheat, barley and 
oilseeds. In comparison with the European countries, the Australian mixed crop farm 
faces higher price risks. Unlike three countries in Europe, where cereal price intervention 
systems exist for wheat and barley and the proportion of export in crop production is 
low, Australian farms are more exposed to price fluctuation in international markets. 
Moreover, the average price coefficients of variation are found to be less than the yield 
coefficient of variation except for wheat, which is consistent with the risk perception of 
farms that yield risk dominates other risks. 
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Figure 2-6 Variability of crop prices: Australia versus other countries 
Overall, farm risk has certain unique distinguishing features in Australia. Yield risk is 
higher and more systemic here than in other countries. Price risk is higher due to the 
exposure to world markets and exchange rate variability. Also, negative price yield 
correlations at the farm level are comparable to other countries. These specific 
characteristics of yield risk in Australia have significant implications for good risk 
management policy. 
 
Weather and Climate Risk in Agriculture 
Agriculture is considered to be extremely susceptible to weather risk particularly drought 
(DAFF 2012; George et al. 2005; Hatt, Heyhoe & Whittle 2012; Keogh, Tomlinson & 
Potard 2013).  Several scholarly debates have focused on this risk particularly in the 
context of climate change (Rosenzweig et al. 2001; Stern 2006; Webb 2006; Parry et al. 
2007; Hennessy et al. 2008; Hertel & Rosch 2010; Cuevas 2011; Keogh 2013).  In the 
context of Australian agriculture scholars have identified three broad categories of risk 
layers. The first layer occurs frequently but has low impact. The third layer has low 
probability of occurrence but has the highest level of impact. The second layer is in 
between the two in terms of probability of occurrence and magnitude of impact. Since 
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farmers are generally able to handle the first layer well by themselves, we focus more on 
the second and third layers in this paper. The risk to Australian agriculture due to 
extreme weather events falls in the third layer category and has been more challenging.   
Another way of characterising risk in Australian agriculture is the risk due to the 
occurrence of droughts and floods. Australian climate has been associated with El Nino 
Southern Oscillation (ENSO) Index and La Nina events (BoM 2012b). The droughts of 
1902, 1972, 1982 and 2002 are associated with ENSO events while the floods of 1973, 
1974, 1999 and 2000 are attributed to La Nina events. The La Nina events over the 
period 2010 to 2012 resulted in the record rainfall and floods in Australia. The two 
events, El Nino and La Nina are both naturally part of the global climate system that 
result from the interaction between the Pacific Ocean and the atmosphere above it (BoM 
2012b). The link between sea surface temperature and its impact on agricultural losses 
were emphasised by (Hoppe 2007) while the impact of the ENSO and ocean temperature 
is addressed in Botterill and Hayes (2012).  
Both ENSO and La Nina are related to the Southern Oscillation Index (SOI) which has a 
strong relationship with wheat yield in Australia (Rimmington & Nicholls 1993). The 
movements in these weather indices have been the underlying influence of the temporal 
and spatial variability of wheat yield in Australia because of their interconnectedness 
with rainfall variability (Potgieter, Hammer & Butler 2002). The implication of these 
relationships is that these climatic indicators are in some ways related to agricultural 
productions in Australia because of their relationship with the Australian climate 
particularly rainfall (McIntosh, Ash & Smith 2005; Webb 2006).  
In an attempt to capture this interconnectedness, Sea Surface Temperature (SST) was 
related with the gross output of Australian crops. It was noted that more than fifty per 
cent variance in gross value was explained by Sea Surface Temperature (Hammer, 
Nicholls & Mitchell 2000). The implication is that as these events influence 
meteorological characteristics of the Australian climate, they also affect the hydrological 
characteristics with consequent implications on the agricultural output and eventually the 
social welfare of the Australian community (Wilhite 2007).  
Webb (2006) established that the variations in Australian agricultural output vary from 
year to year, with a consequent loss of as much as 10% of farm production value. The 
author cited the drought of 2002 which cost 70,000 jobs, 30% reduction in agricultural 
output and 1.6% reduction in GDP. Drought could have cost implications for the farmer 
in that pasture production will be low and given that demand is higher than supply, the 
cost will rise. Paddock cost was $15, 858 per year in non-drought years but jumped to 
$42, 440 in years of drought in Tocal homestead in (DPI 2013). Other costs may 
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however not follow the same direction but may not make up for the increase to a 
commensurate extent. This increase in costs of input explains why prices of primary 
products could rise during droughts (Gray et al. 1995). In addition to the passing 
through of increased costs of production to the consumers, demands would tend to 
outweigh supply giving additional incentives to suppliers to increase the prices of their 
products in the case of crops but the converse is the case for livestock.  
Besides rainfall forecasting, other sources of risk that are significant include frost, hail 
and fire risk. Bush fires may not be directly related to weather conditions but bush fire 
index shows an indirect relationship to weather (Sivakumar & Motha 2007; ABS 2012). 
The index combines expected wind speed, humidity, temperature and a measure of 
vegetation dryness on a daily basis to facilitate preparedness. The implication is that 
these other risks that farmers face are not unrelated to weather and climatic conditions. 
For example, the years following major floods tend to be followed by heavy bush fires 
because of the wild growth of forest in the preceding years that serve as fuel for the fire.  
Climate and weather risk events lead to yield and price shocks in Australian agriculture.  
Weather risk affects all parameters of farm income but yield risk is of higher significance 
than price risk and input risk (Malcolm 1985; Hammer, Woodruff & Robinson 1987; 
George et al. 2005; Hatt, Heyhoe & Whittle 2012). The variability in prices has been 
attributed to the focus of the Australian agricultural productions on exports and the fact 
that there is currently no government price support although there are other options that 
individual farmers could adopt to hedge their risks (Craik & MacRae 2010; Kimura & 
Antón 2011; NRAC 2012). Given that the prices received by farmers could be highly 
variable because of reasons unrelated to domestic demand and supply and the 
Australian export is largely dependent on commodities particularly wheat, Australia is 
prone to high variability on commodity prices (Malcolm 1985). The case of Australia is 
peculiar because as much as 60% of its agricultural productions are exported annually 
and about 80% for wheat (NRAC 2012, p.11). It is believed that farmers are price takers 
because they are operating in an atomistic market (Longworth 1967; Newbery & Stiglitz 
1979; Kimura & Antón 2011; Hatt, Heyhoe & Whittle 2012; NRAC 2012). The existence 
of other mechanisms like forwards to manage price risk has alleviated the risk.  
Climatic conditions could also influence commodity prices to some extent. Profitability 
concern determines farm management decisions rather than gross revenue on which 
most analyses have been based. Since production costs are usually difficult to estimate 
in agricultural enterprise particularly for labour in an owner-managed enterprise farm 
context (Quiggin, Karagiannis & Stanton 1994), most models have been based on gross 
revenue (Vedenov & Barnett 2004; Kapphan 2012; Khuu & Weber 2013). The inter-
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relationship between production and the demand and supply of agricultural products 
links to the impact of weather on input cost which is a part of the profitability equation 
(Profit = Yield *Price – Input cost) (MunichRe 2011). The net income of the farmer is the 
most important variable from the farmer’s perspective and is less related to yield than 
the gross revenue because of the additional consideration of input costs which is largely 
determined by a farmer’s unique management skills and anticipated output price 
(Malcolm 1985). In times of drought, variations in the cost of labour and other material 
inputs could further impact profitability. Therefore, all three parameters in the 
profitability equation are indirectly linked to the weather. 
The implications of weather extremes make climate forecasting an integral part of 
agricultural management decisions (Khuu & Weber 2013). Nevertheless, weather 
forecasting may not be relevant to agricultural management decisions if the lead time to 
making the decisions is not sufficient (McIntosh, Ash & Smith 2005). The use of these 
phenomena to make agricultural weather forecasts could only be valuable if useful and 
readily grasped management response can be based on them (Rimmington & Nicholls 
1993; McIntosh, Ash & Smith 2005).  
An Overview of Weather Risk Management in Agriculture 
An overview of risk management strategies used in Australian agriculture is summarised 
in Table 2-2.  The strategies are classified in the table according to the criteria outlined 
in the framework in OECD (2009): whether it reduces the probability of occurrence (risk 
reduction), the magnitude of the damage (risk mitigation) or the impact on consumption 
(risk coping), and whether its main action takes place at farm household / community 
level, through markets or through government measures. As can be gleaned from the 
table, there are three ways by which risk in agriculture may be managed. First, the farm 
households could take initiatives to reduce, mitigate or cope with the risk. Second, a 
number of market based solutions such as the use of insurance products or futures 
products may be employed for managing risk. Finally, government assistance and 
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Table 2-2 Risk Management Strategies Used in Australian Agricultural Sector. Source: Kimura and 
Anton (2011) 
 
A survey by the Queensland Department of Primary Industry on drought management strategies 
strategies indicates that farmers undertake many steps to manage the risks they face. The results 
The results are shown in  
Table 2-3. A common drought management strategy used widely across farm sectors is 
the saving of farm maintenance and operating expenses. Further, a wide range of 
financial management strategies such as cutting down personal expenses and using cash 
reserves are adopted. The survey shows the importance of having high equity and 
reserves of liquid assets, as well as diversified income sources in order to cope with 
drought risks. The survey also highlights several sector specific drought risk 
management strategies. Crops farms use the making of an early decision on planting 
and planting different types of crops as the main strategies while stock management of 
livestock and fodder is the key strategy for the livestock sector. Conserving fodder in 
times of surplus to use in times of shortage is a key strategy in extensive livestock 
production. The survey also shows that off-farm income is earned mainly from off-farm 
wages, and salary and investment incomes have increased in real terms during the past 
40 years. Payments from government have also increased. On average, off farm income 
represents over 30% of total farm income (ABARE 2006). Broadacre farmers with off-
farm wages increased from 25% in 1977-78 to 45% in 2007-08. For dairy farmers, the 
percentage receiving off-farm wages increased from 26% in 1977-78 to 35% in 2007-
08. 
A diversification strategy is an integral part of risk management of crop farm systems. 
First, livestock are vital to many cropping systems as they utilize crop residues and 
graze the areas of crop farms that are not cropped in any given year.  Second, 
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diversification in continuous cropping systems is inevitable because of the need to have 
disease break crops after a series of cereal crops. Therefore a mix of cereals, oil seed 
and grain legume crops are grown in any cropping system in any year. Diversification, 
even within specialized cropping systems, has the effect of exposing the business to a 
range of crop markets and prices, and to crop and livestock markets and prices.  
 
Table 2-3 Drought Management Strategies in Queensland Agriculture (percentage of farms). 
Source: Queensland Department of Primary Industry (2004)
 
 
Table 2-4 presents the average coefficient of variation of per hectare return for each 
diversified production at the farm level. The farmer can benefit from diversification as 
long as the coefficient of correlation of returns across crops is less than one. Table 2-5 
shows the correlation matrix of per hectare return across crops and each production 
element. It is clear from these tables that a farmer can gain advantages from 
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diversifying production. The variability of per hectare return of crop production is lower 
than that of wheat, barley and oilseed production. Moreover, since the data shows the 
negative correlations between crop and livestock, the potential for diversification 
between crops and livestock is particularly important in Australia. The coefficient of 
variation of per hectare output is significantly lower than the coefficient of variation of 
both crop and livestock outputs, indicating that in fact producers are benefiting from 
production diversification between crop and livestock sectors. 
 






Table 2-5 Correlation of per hectare revenue 
 
 
The major risk faced by cotton growers in recent years is the availability of water. This 
has resulted in a more opportunistic approach to cotton production, with diversification 
to other dryland cropping activities as part of the whole farm system. Further, cotton is 
completely exposed to export markets and because of the exposure to exchange rate 
risks, there is a greater tradition of using futures pricing instruments than is the case in 
any other activity. The majority of cotton growers actively manage price risk exposure 
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using forward and futures pricing instruments, whereas only a small proportion of cereal 
growers use forward pricing methods.   
Market Based Solutions  
In this section, we review market based solutions to deal with risk in the context of 
Australian agriculture. First, we review the existence and use of crop insurance. Second, 
we review the use of price hedging through futures market and forward contracting. 
Finally, we review the use of water markets as a risk management tool.  
 
Figure 2-7 Risks faced by farmers 
As shown in the figure above, farmers are subject to revenue risk, of which yield and 
price are components. Price risk may be managed through hedging products such as 
futures and forwards.  Yield risk is handled by using insurance products.  There are two 
types of insurance products – traditional insurance products and index based products. 
Named peril insurance, multi-peril crop insurance and crop revenue insurance for the 
three types of traditional insurance products that are in prevalence.   
Named peril insurance products provide farmers with protection against specific risks 
such as hail, frost and fire. These products are available in Australia and many farmers 
use them. Insuring vulnerable crops against hail damage is common for most crop 
farms. Insuring farm assets, including animals, against loss by fire is extensively used by 
farmers. Insurance against frost damage is available for horticultural crops. Crop 
insurance against the risk of loss by hail, fire, and frost amounts to around $7-10 billion 
worth of crops insured each year, with a total premium around AUD 200 million, spread 
amongst 6-7 insurers. Around 85% of this exposure is then reinsured with reinsurers 
(Kimura and Anton, 2011). 
Multi-peril crop insurance (MPCI) is also known as yield insurance because payouts are 
based on loss of yield while the cause of the loss is not assessed. For each crop covered 
under the policy, the insurer agrees with the grower on projected yield and projected 
value ($ per tonne). Hence, there is an agreed value on each crop covered by the policy. 
No such schemes operate currently in Australia.  However, a number of industry groups 
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have called for government support for multi-peril crop insurance. A number of feasibility 
studies have been conducted by the Governments or researchers during the past 25 
years. Most studies conclude that multi-peril crop insurance would not be commercially 
viable without government support (Government of Western Australia 2009). An Ernst & 
Young study on the feasibility of multi-peril crop insurance found that only 18% of farm 
businesses were likely to subscribe to insurance at viable premium levels (Ernst & Young 
2000).  
Crop revenue insurance insures a farmer against both yield and price risk. It provides 
protection against revenue loss. A projected price and yield is determined when the 
insurance contract is entered into, and farmers are insured for production at that price. 
Currently crop revenue insurance is not available in Australia. 
There are three types of index-based insurance products that are in prevalence - 
weather derivatives, yield index insurance and area yield index insurance.  Farmers can 
use these tools to insure against yield risk. An index may simply be a set of numbers 
representing a single variable, such as rainfall or temperature over a given cropping 
season or a more complex calculation involving many variables, such as various climatic 
data or shire-level yield data that are expected to have an impact on farm yields.  
Weather derivatives, or weather certificates, are comparatively simple products based on 
an index representing a single variable, such as rainfall or temperature. They are similar 
to financial derivatives, that is, they are derived from an underlying variable. Weather 
derivative indexes are developed using data from weather stations. An index can be 
developed for any weather station where sufficient data exists. The farmer chooses the 
closest weather station to his or her farm to ensure that the weather index is the nearest 
approximation to conditions on their farm. The weather derivative would payout if, for 
instance, rainfall is below a pre-specified amount over a pre-specified time period.  One 
example of a weather derivatives product, CelsiusPro, currently operates in Australia. 
Yield index insurance is a complex insurance product that brings together several 
variables to predict farmer yield through computer modelling. Variables may include 
shire-level yields and climate related factors, as well as crop specific factors, such as 
timing of planting, crop phenology and crop management practices. The model provides 
a forecast for a farmer’s yield based on this information. At the end of the season the 
model provides an updated estimate of farmer yield based on realised weather 
conditions. If the estimate is lower than the original forecast, the farmer receives a 
payout. A typical yield index insurance product, YieldShield, is currently available in 
Australia. 
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An area yield index, or group risk plan, is between a traditional insurance product and 
the newer index product. An area yield index is based on regional level yields. Farmers 
receive payments if average yields in their region fall below a pre-specified level, as 
opposed to receiving payout for a fall in their own individual yields. Currently this 
product is not available in Australia. 
As can be seen in Table 2-6 and Table 2-7, forward and futures contracts are available 
for several agricultural commodities. However, the use of these derivative markets 
varies significantly between major commodities. The Australian Wheat Board extensively 
uses futures and option contracts on commodity price and exchange rates. However, the 
fully deregulated grain market has experienced a significant increase in grain marketing 
opportunities and methods. Wheat growers have the choice of selling directly to a large 
number of export buyers or into private cooperative pools. Grain can be sold directly to 
end users, increasingly making use of established relationships and forward contracting. 
There has been an increase in on-farm storage to allow selling throughout the year. This 
enables growers to hedge by selling through time and into several markets. Use of 
futures pricing methods is increasing, mainly in the form of over-the-counter products 
provided by financial institutions. Futures and options products are available, based on 
the Australian futures exchange or the Chicago mercantile exchange. The potential of 
options to manage price risk is increasingly being recognized, although mostly large 
growers currently make use of them.  
Futures markets for trading futures contracts in wool and wheat are available at the 
Sydney Futures Exchange (now ASX). Historically, there have been futures markets for 
lamb and beef cattle. Wheat futures are also traded in the Chicago mercantile exchange. 
Interest rate and exchange rate futures also trade in the market. Little use is made of 
commodity futures trading instruments due partly to its inability to cover the individual 
basis risk. Instead, the main users of futures markets are commodity marketers. Table 7 
summarizes the main futures markets used by Australian commodity marketers by 
commodity. The use of international futures markets, such as Chicago Board of Trade, 
has the advantage of high liquidity of trade, but the participants suffer from higher basis 
risk than when trading on the Australian futures market. Over the past two decades, 
several futures contracts such as lamb, and cattle have ceased to trade in the Australian 
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Table 2-6 Futures and forwards used in Australian agriculture sector 
 
Source: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry of the Australian Government  
 
Table 2-7 Providers of Forward Contracts  
 
Source: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry of the Australian Government  
After the deregulation of commodity markets, a wide range of commercial marketers 
started to offer various forward contracts as shown in Table 6. Forward contracting of 
sales is common in large, intensive horticultural and animal activities. Forward purchase 
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agreements for feed inputs are widely used in dairying and intensive animal activities 
such as pig, egg and broiler production. The major proportion of all milk produced in 
Australia is processed and sold by farmer-owned dairy processing co-operatives. These 
co-operatives supply inputs, including credit, and are eligible for some concessionary 
taxation treatments of aspects of their business operations. Also, numerous small farmer 
co-operatives exist for marketing of grains, wool, lambs, and for purchasing inputs.  
Commercial banks have become a major provider of forward contracts for agricultural 
commodities. In order to reduce the transaction costs associated with forward contracts, 
Meat and Livestock Australia has prepared a standard form of forward contract, with 
trading terms and conditions between cattle producers and marketers.  
Cotton growers are the most prominent users of futures to manage price risk (Ada et al., 
2007). It is not as common in the wool industry where less than 5% of woolgrowers use 
wool futures (Lubulwa et al., 1997). Around 20% of wheat growers use market price risk 
management techniques such as futures contracts, options, and over the counter 
products such as swaps. Around 10% of the annual wool production is sold using forward 
contracts or with some other form of price protection, with 85 to 90% of wool continuing 
to be sold at auction each year (Deane and Malcolm, 2007). The top 25% wool 
producers, in terms of financial performance, dedicate 8% of their annual wool 
production to price risk management, while for the remaining 75% of farms, only 4% of 
their production is subject to price risk management (ABARE, 2006). 
Development of water markets 
Variable rainfall and the frequent risk of drought make efficient water management a key 
risk management strategy for Australian farmers. Water trading is the process of buying, 
selling, leasing or otherwise exchanging water access entitlements (permanent trade) or 
water allocations (temporary trade). The water markets for irrigation allow farmers, and 
the public, to compete to obtain water for alternative uses, including environmental 
uses. The aim is to ensure that irrigation schemes operate more effectively and that 
farmers, by paying the market price for water, are forced to use water as efficiently as 
other potential buyers and competing users of water. Buying and selling water on the 
market enables irrigation water to move from less valuable to more valuable uses. 
Water markets contribute to a producer’s drought risk management in multiple ways. 
First, water markets provide an incentive for farmers to use water more efficiently, 
depending on climate conditions. Producers can purchase water allocations in wet 
periods at low prices and expand farming operations, while selling their water allocations 
at high prices and reduce the size of their operation. Second, selling permanent water 
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entitlements can mitigate the adverse impact of droughts on farm income. The asset 
value of water entitlement is, by nature, counter-cyclical with the availability of water.  
Role of Government 
The Australian government facilitates risk management in the agriculture sector through 
a variety of initiatives. Broadly, these may be classified into Catastrophic Risk 
Management, Drought Relief, Training, and Tax Relief.  
Catastrophic risk management 
In Australia, most government measures that deal with risk management are focused on 
management of catastrophic risks such as natural disasters and animal/plant diseases. 
There are two main policy frameworks that manage weather related risks: the National 
Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangement (NDRRA) and the National Drought Policy 
(NDP). The former provides ad hoc type ex post assistance for communities and 
individuals to deal with different types of catastrophic climate risks except for drought. 
The latter is specifically addressed through drought risk management, which originally 
was considered as one of the natural disasters covered by NDRRA. More frequent, 
damaging and longstanding droughts have led to the creation of a separated National 
Drought Policy framework (NDP) in 1992. In addition, Bio-Security Partnership 
Arrangement provides the public-private partnership arrangement to share the risk of 
animal/plant disease outbreak among the stake holders. 
In Australia, federal, state and local government agencies combine to administer disaster 
relief, depending to some extent on the nature and area of the disaster. The Natural 
Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA) is a policy framework under which 
State governments develop their own programmes and measures, make the assessment 
of circumstances and trigger assistance. The federal government only provides partial 
reimbursement of measures that fall under the designated categories. The NDRRA is 
automatically triggered when state/territory expenditures on an event exceeds AUD 240 
000. NDRRA covers losses due to bushfire, earthquake, flood, storm, storm surge, 
cyclone, landslide, tsunami, meteorite strike and tornado, but not drought, frost, human 
or animal epidemic. Under the NDRRA, relief or recovery aid applies only to compensate 
damage or distress arising as a direct result of a natural disaster. It does not provide 
compensation for losses and farmers are generally not eligible for support if insurance 
can cover the loss.  
Drought Policy 
The commonwealth has had numerous drought assistance schemes over the years. 
Assistance for drought has previously been available through the above mentioned 
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NDRRA scheme but was removed when drought was redefined and no longer considered 
a ‘disaster’. 
One of the most involved and high level drought assistance schemes was the National 
Drought Policy (NDP). The objectives of the NDP were to: 1) encourage primary 
producers and other sections of rural Australia to adopt self-reliant approaches for 
managing climate variability; 2) maintain and protect Australia’s agricultural and 
environmental resource base during periods of extreme stress; and 3) ensure early 
recovery of agricultural and rural industries that are consistent with long-term 
sustainable levels. Providing short-term assistance to long-term viable producers was 
the key operational policy objective of NDP.  
The policy support became available in a region only after a government declaration of 
‘Exceptional Circumstance’ (EC). These were defined as “rare and severe events outside 
those a farmer could normally be expected to manage using responsible farm 
management strategies”.  Three operational criteria were used to determine an EC: 
 must be rare, that is it must not have occurred more than once on average in 
every 20 to 25 years; 
 must result in a rare and severe downturn in farm income over a prolonged 
period of time (e.g. greater than 12 months); 
 must be a single event that is not part of long-term structural adjustment 
processes or of normal fluctuations in commodity prices. 
These operational criteria are assessed, within the context of local practices, on the basis 
of meteorological conditions, crop yield, pasture and stock conditions, water supplies, 
and farm income levels. Once an area is declared EC, three main programmes were 
made available to farmers: the EC Relief Payment, the EC Interest Rate Subsidy and the 
EC Exit package. 
The EC Relief Payment (ECRP) covered the essential day-to-day living expenses of farm 
households, with payments equivalent to the unemployment allowance for the non-farm 
sectors (Newstart allowance). In 2008-09, approximately 24 500 farm households 
received ECRP payments, totalling AUD 339 million.  
The EC Interest Rate Subsidy (ECIRS) aimed to support the long-term viability of an 
enterprise suffering from financial difficulty due to a EC event. Both farm business and 
farm dependent rural small business in EC declared area were eligible to apply for 
ECIRS. It covered up to 50% of the interest payable on all loans excluding recent 
property purchases in the first year and up to 80% in subsequent years. Since the 
eligibility for ECRP and ECIRS wasn’t mutually exclusive, a farmer could have accessed 
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both ECRP and ECIRS at the same time. The ECIRS payments were limited to AUD 100 
000 per 12-month period, with cumulative support capped at AUD 500 000 over five 
years. 
Finally, EC Exit Package was designed to assist non-viable farms to exit the sector. It 
consisted of an Exit Grant, which provided a taxable one-off payment of up to AUD 150 
000, an Advice and Retraining Grant and a Relocation Grant up to AUD 10 000 for 
relocation expenses. A farmer receiving an exit package had to declare that they will not 
return to the agricultural sector within five years. As of 5 December 2008, only 98 
applicants received the package out of 469 claims. Of those who received exit 
assistance, 64 also received either ECIRS or ECRP before leaving the industry. The exit 
package is hardly used partly because it imposed more restrictive criteria with an asset 
test of AUD 350 000. 
Currently the Farm Household Allowance (FHA) is the available assistance for farmers’ in 
drought.  This provides farmers and their families experiencing financial hardship 
financial support. This payment is managed through the Department of Human Services 
and is tailored to farmers, taking in to account off farm income (Applicants’ income must 
be below the cut-off point for Newstart Allowance or Youth Allowance) and a two-part 
asset test. Part 1 is the non-farm and liquid assets test and Part 2 total net farm assists 
test – the total mush be below AUD 2.55 million. 
Tax policy 
The Australian government provides tax incentives to retain a certain cash reserve. The 
Farm Management Deposits (FMD) scheme allows farmers to deposit up to AUD 800 000 
of income earned that is then excluded from taxable income until it is withdrawn from 
the FMD if kept for at least 12 months. This financial year (16/17) the early access 
trigger during times of drought was re-established; and the law preventing FMDs being 
used as offset accounts against primary production business debt was removed. 
FMDs defer and save tax, and aim to provide a means to reduce inequity that may derive 
from highly fluctuating incomes and progressive income tax schedules, thereby achieving 
the increased self-reliance. As at March 2017, aggregate FMD holdings totalled over AUD 
42 billion, with over AUD 900 million in FMDs in Queensland. In addition to the FMD 
scheme, primary producers can also use a tax averaging scheme that allows their 
current taxable income to be assessed at the tax rate applicable to their average income 
in the current year and the four preceding years. Under this scheme, a farmer pays 
lower taxes when they have higher taxable income than the average of previous five 
years, but a higher tax is imposed when the taxable income is lower than the average of 
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the previous five years. This scheme also has the effect of smoothing income by avoiding 
a higher tax rate that would be applicable in high income years. 
Policy directions 
The major policy challenge for risk management in Australian agriculture is to refocus 
from mitigating financial impacts of adverse weather effects to facilitating farmers’ 
adaptation to climate changes. Since it is unlikely that the current framework of drought 
risk management is sustainable, we consider the following policy directions. 
 Firstly, a feasibility study of developing commercially viable insurance products to 
cover drought risk is strongly recommended. The potential demand for such 
products is high due to high yield variability and the systemic nature of yield risk 
for many crops. The study should include consultations with insurers, farmers and 
other stakeholders and should consider an appropriate system for information 
sharing on risks. Further, the study should identify potential obstacles that 
preclude the viability of the commercial crop insurance market.  
 Secondly, the feasibility of index-based insurance should be explored. The 
systemic nature of yield shocks in Australia associated with a drought makes this 
study especially more meaningful since the high correlation between rainfall in 
weather stations and farms results in low basis risk.  
 Finally, a study regarding information and training support to empower farmers to 
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3. Methods 
Survey data collection 
We used a structured questionnaire (Appendix A) to survey a total of 55 farmer 
responses (23 cotton growers and 32 sugar cane growers) across Queensland (Figure 
3-1). Surveys were conducted by research project partner, Queensland Farmers’ 
Federation (QFF).  
 
 
Figure 3-1 Distribution of survey participants across (a) three cotton growing areas and (b) three 
sugar cane growing areas in Queensland. 
The survey asked for general information about the farming context and risk 
management practices, including industry Best Management Practice (BMP) certification. 
Participants were asked to score their perceptions of the severity and likelihood of 
particular risks on a 5-point scale, and to estimate the impact such events had had on 
the productivity/profitability of their cropping enterprise. A number of questions were 
open ended, to which participants could provide extended answers. Survey responses 
were collated and, where relevant, summarised (average values ± 1 standard error). 
Insufficient numbers of samples were available for more robust statistical analysis of 
differences between groups in most instances.  
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APSIM analysis  
Background 
Agricultural production depends upon a variety of interconnected factors (e.g. 
environmental, crop genetics, agronomic practices). Crop growth models are increasingly 
used in a management and policy setting to quantify the impact on yield of changes due 
to climate or crop management (Asseng et al., 2013; Martre et al., 2014). These models 
provide information on the health and maximum attainable yield of a crop. 
Given the variety of crop growth models and their relative strengths and weaknesses, 
ensembles of crop models are being progressively developed for yield/production 
forecasting purposes. This approach helps improve accuracy and consistency in 
simulating growth dynamics under various environmental conditions. 
An integrated crop yield/production forecasting system (which combines crop growth and 
climate models, and statistical tools) may provide industry stakeholders such as 
growers, commodity traders and policy developers with early warning of the potential 
climate risks, the likely impacts and their severity to expected crop yields at different 
lead times. 
The objective of this activity was to develop an operational integrated seasonal climate-
crop modelling system for yield and production forecasting of major Queensland crops 
(wheat, sorghum, sugarcane and cotton). The modelling approach is based on a multi-
model ensemble approach for crop growth simulation. 
The modelling framework developed here as well as the simulated variables will be used 
in the sister projects DCAP USQ 6 (“Enhanced multi-peril crop insurance”) and DCAP 
USQ 14 (“Crop production modelling under climate change and regional adaptation”). 
Materials and Methods 
Model selection 
A careful review of literature was carried out to identify the potential crop models that 
can be used in the ensemble crop models. Most crop models simulate the dynamics of 
phenological development, biomass growth and partitioning, water and nitrogen cycling 
in an atmosphere–crop–soil system, driven by daily weather variables of rainfall, 
maximum and minimum temperatures and solar radiation. A summary of the main 
modelling approaches involved in the selected crop models reviewed is given in 
Supplementary Table S1. The main criteria used for selecting relevant models for our 
study include: (1) the popularity of the model (at national and international levels), (2) 
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its performance as reported in published studies, (3) the model structure and easiness of 
use within the project time frame (e.g., implementation, data collection and calibration, 
etc.), (4) the availability of model updates, and (5) a crop model which considers the 
various aspects of climate change as drivers (including rainfall, atmospheric CO2, 
temperature and ozone). 
Among the 16 crop models reviewed, the Agricultural Production Systems Simulator 
(APSIM; Keating et al., 2003) and the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology 
Transfer (DSSAT; Jones et al., 2003) were by far the crop models meeting our criteria. 
They both share some similarities (e.g., point-specific model, minimum number of 
climate input variables, light interception and utilization, etc.); but also present some 
differences (Supplementary Table S1) that make them suitable to capture a range of 
uncertainties. They have been used in several crop models comparison studies (e.g., 
Asseng et al., 2013; Martre et al., 2014; Marin et al., 2015; Asseng et al., 2016; dos 
Santos Vianna and Sentelhas, 2016; Stokes et al., 2016), and for various agricultural 
purposes, including crop growth monitoring and yield forecasting, impact studies of crop 
management practices, decision support tools (see 
http://www.apsim.info/Products/Publications.aspx; http://dssat.net/publications ). 
However, unlike APSIM, DSSAT has not been used widely for operational purpose in 
Australia. 
APSIM version 8 and DSSAT version 4.6 were used in our analysis. 
Study sites and climate data 
Figure 3-2 shows the sites used for simulating crop growth in APSIM and DSSAT. 
Overall, 10, 12 and 19 sites were considered for cotton, sugarcane, and wheat and 
sorghum, respectively. Daily climate data (minimum and maximum temperatures, 
rainfall, solar radiation, and evaporation) for the 1940-2016 period retrieved from SILO’s 
patch point data set (https://www.longpaddock.qld.gov.au/silo) (Jeffrey et al., 2001) 
were used. These weather data were converted in a format suitable for DSSAT using the 
WeatherMan (v. 4.5; Pickering et al., 1994). 
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Figure 3-2 Simulated sites considered for crop growth simulations in APSIM and DSSAT. Simulation 
site #1: sites used for simulating wheat, sorghum and cotton yields; Simulation site #2: sites used 
for simulating sugarcane yield. QLD SA4: Queensland statistical area level 4 as for 2016. (Source: 
Queensland Spatial Catalogue – QSpatial; http://qldspatial.information.qld.gov.au). 
 
Configuration of simulations 
Different levels of inputs and management factors were simulated. These factors include 
the crop type, sowing date, sowing/planting density, nitrogen fertilizer rate, and plant 
available water capacity (PAWC). A summary of the simulation options used is provided 
in Table 3-1. Pests, diseases, and weeds were not simulated and it was assumed that 
the grower would take all reasonable steps to control these in any case. Consequently 
the simulated yields are potential yields. 
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The nitrogen fertilizer amount considered for wheat, sorghum and cotton growth were 
set to represent the common practice in the growing regions. They ranged from 25 to 
150 N kg ha-1. Regarding sugarcane growth, they were chosen based on the average 
annual applications in sugar-producing districts, which range from 150 to 200 N kg ha-1 
(Bell et al., 2015). 
Irrigation was applied only for sugarcane growth simulation. The irrigation requirement 
(IR) was based on the values of sugar producing district to which they belong (Hardie et 
al., 2000). IR varies from 0 to 1,400 mm (nil to supplementary to full irrigation). For 
example, full irrigation is required in the Burdekin district (IR = 1,070 mm), extensive 
and moderate to extensive supplementary irrigations in Bundaberg (IR = 780 mm) and 
Mackay/Proserpine (IR = 860 mm), respectively (Hardie et al., 2000). In our analysis, 
irrigation dates were arbitrarily fixed since they vary from farm to farm in a given same 
district. However, a minimum period of 14 days between irrigation applications was kept. 
For all simulated sites for sugarcane a planting stalk density of 10 plants/m2 was used 
for a cycle including one plant crop (14 months) and 4 ratoons (12 months each). 
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Table 3-1 Parameters and factors used for simulating cotton and sugarcane in APSIM and DSSAT. The level column refers to the abbreviation used for 








Planting date (doy) Level 
Default C1 15-may (135) P1 
   15-jun (166) P2 
   




5  P1 Irrigation (mm)  
7.5  P2 30 I1 
10  P3 50 I2 
12.5  P4 70 I3 
   
   
Sowing date (doy) 
 
N Fertilizer    
01-Oct (274) S1 100  N1 
15-Oct (288) S2 150  N2 
01-Nov (305) S3 200  N3 
15-Nov (319) S4    
15-Dec (349) S5    
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Eight different soils retrieved from the APSoil database (Dalgliesh et al., 2012) were 
used according to the site for the simulation of sugarcane in APSIM (Table 2). While for 
wheat, sorghum and cotton, two main “default” vertosol soil types were used according 
to the geographical position of the site. Soil parameters were set according to the 
dominant soils in that region as reported in the APSoil database and expert knowledge. 
The PAWC considered ranged from 80 to 240 mm. An example of soil parameters for 
vertosol soils with PAWC = 190 mm is presented in Table 3. For their use in DSSAT, 
default soils were built based on corresponding information available in the soil files used 
in ASPIM. Values of missing soil parameters were retrieved from the Soil and Landscape 
Grid of Australia website (http://www.clw.csiro.au/aclep/soilandlandscapegrid/) or 
estimated based on functions implemented in DSSAT- soil module (Uryasev et al., 
2004). 
 
Table 3-2 APsoil soil types used for the simulation of sugarcane in APSIM and DSSAT. 
APsoil soil type Site 
Climate station 
ID 
Hydrosol (No 878) Meringa 31040 
Brown Dermosol (No 648) Macknade 32032 
Yellow Dermosol (No 647) Tully 32042 
Victoria 32045 
Silty clay loam over light clay (No 682) Burdekin 33002 
Farleigh 33023 
Plane Creek 33059 
Medium clay (No 820) Pleystowe 33060 
Loam (No 706) Mackay 33119 
Loam (No 1074) Fairymead 39037 
Redoxic Hydrosol (No 650) Bundaberg 39174 
Red Ferrosol (No 1064) Bingera 39186 
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Table 3-3 Soil parameters for 2 vertosol soils (PAWC = 190 mm) used for the simulation of cotton growth APSIM. 
Cotton 
Vertosol #1 Depth LL PAWC KL 
 
(cm) (mm/mm) (mm) (/day) 
 
0-15 0.28 36.8 0.08 
 
15-30 0.29 34.5 0.08 
 
30-60 0.305 63 0.08 
 
60-90 0.325 55.5 0.08 
 
Vertosol #2 0-15 0.3 30 0.08 
 
15-30 0.305 28.5 0.08 
 
30-60 0.32 48 0.08 
 
60-90 0.34 40.5 0.08 
 
90-120 0.355 34.5 0.07 
 
120-130 0.365 10 0.06 
BD: bulk density; AirDry: air dry mm water/ mm soil; LL15: lower limit of plant-extractable soil water (i.e., water content at 15 bar); 
DUL: volumetric water content at drained upper limit; SAT: volumetric water content at saturation; PAWC: plant available water capacity; 
KL: root water extraction rate. 
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Default crop cultivars for wheat, cotton and sorghum (as available in the standard 
release of APSIM v.8) were used for APSIM simulations. Modified crop cultivars were 
used for sugarcane for APSIM and for all crops in DSSAT. Details are provided in the next 
subsections. 
Sugarcane cultivars in APSIM 
Preliminary analyses based on the crop varieties available in the standard release of 
APSIM-sugar and historical sugar mill data suggest the need of an update of key crop 
parameters. Although the most used sugar varieties in papers consulted during the 
literature review are “Q117” and “Q124” (see for example Keating et al., 1999; Carberry 
et al., 2009; Meier and Thorburn, 2016), it appears that those varieties are no longer (or 
barely) used on farms (QCANESelectTM, Sugar Research Australia, 2017). For instance, 
the proportions of area planted by variety in Australia from 1999 to 2013 show that the 
percentage of varieties Q117 and Q124 decreased from 7.7% and 45.6% to nil (Figure 
3-3). The same could applied to the remaining varieties available in APSIM-sugar. The 
modifications performed are given in Table 3-4. The values of the selected parameters 
were varied within a range constituted by their corresponding values as reported in the 
standard release of APSIM-sugar. Simulated cane yield and CCS were then compared to 
the historical mill data, and the better combination (the one resulting in low mean 
square and absolute errors) was kept. Obviously, historical mill data encompass several 
varieties and different crop management practices across a given region.  
 
Figure 3-3 Percentage of hectares grown by sugarcane variety in Queensland and New South 
Wales for 1999 and 2013 (Source: Sexton, 2015). 
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Table 3-4 Ranges of selected variety parameters as reported in the standard release of APSIM-
sugar, and modified parameters. The modifications applied both to the plant crop and ratoons. 
Q177: default cultivar; Q117_m and Q117_n: modified cultivars. 
Crop parameter Description Unit Range Q117 Q117_m Q117_n 













g g-1 1.0··0.55 – 
1.0··0.64 







g m-2 800 - 1500 800 1000 1500 
green_leaf_no Green leaf 
number 
leaves 10 - 13 13 10 10 
 
Crop varieties used in DSSAT 
Default cultivar coefficients were modified based on published studies and their 
corresponding values in the standard release of APSIM. Those for cotton were based on 
the works of Cammarano et al. (2012), Pathak et al. (2007), and Ortiz et al. (2009); 
whereas for sugarcane, values of cultivar coefficients were modified based on Jones and 
Singels (2008) and dos Santos Vianna and Sentelhas (2016). The parameters modified 
used are reported in Table 3-5. 
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Table 3-5 Genotype coefficients used for cotton and sugarcane growth simulation in DSSAT. The 
description of the coefficients is provided in Annexe 1. 
Cotton Sugarcane 
Parameter Cultivar1 Parameter Cultivar1 
CSDL 23 MaxPARCE 9.9 
PPSEN 0.01 APFMX 0.88 
EM-FL 48.46 STKPFMAX 0.65 
FL-SH 10 SUCA 0.58 
FL-SD 12 TBFT 25 
SD-PM 34.28 Tthalfo 250 
FL-LF 85.16 TBase 16 
LFMAX 1.4 LFMAX 12 
SLAVR 175 MXLFAREA 360 
SIZLF 200 MXLFARNO 15 
XFRT 1 PI1 69 
WTPSD 0.19 PI2 169 
SFDUR 5.5 PSWITCH 18 
SDPDV 30 TTPLNTEM 428 
PODUR 14.7 TTRATNEM 203 
THRSH 70 CHUPIBASE 1050 
SDPRO 0.153 TT_POPGROWTH 600 
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Climate risk assessment  
A ‘climate and agricultural risk assessment and reporting tool’ (prototype) was developed 
as part of the project. The tool can be accessed through http://icacs.usq.edu.au/risk/ , 
but is currently password protected. This ‘tool’ allows quantification of key climate risks, 
initially for sugar and cotton industry.  The outputs from this tool are given in Climate 
assessment risk and reporting tool - Risk Quantification and data presentation 
Example efficiency analysis of rainfall index on 
northern Queensland regional sugar cane yield 
Here we present example analysis for sugar cane in northern Queensland as a proof of 
concept. We modelled sugar yield as a function of rainfall, temperature and radiation. We 
focus on rainfall, but acknowledge the potential for similar insurance instruments to be 
derived from temperature or other climatic variables that are important determinants of 
crop yield. In northern Queensland high rainfall is related to crop loss. Even though we 
focus on high rainfall the approach outlined is applicable to other climatic drivers of crop 
loss (e.g. drought, heat waves, frost, etc.).We compare our modelled results with on 
ground survey results for verification.  
Methods 
Regression model of sugar cane yields relationship with climatic factors 
Sugar cane yields were modelled as a function of rainfall, radiation and temperature. 
Sugar cane yields were detrended total sugar cane yields (tonne/ha) for each year from 
1972-2014 from the northern Queensland sugar producing regions in Queensland (data 
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016). Climate data was from stations which 
were distributed across the regions (BOM 2017). Models were fit using a generalized 
additive model, which fits non-linear models using a spline and a Markov chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) algorithm implemented in JAGS 4.2.0 called via the R package rjags 3.10 
(Plummer 2003, 2016), R2jags (Su and Yajima 2015) and the Mgcv package (Wood 
2016) in R (R Core Team 2016). We ran 3 chains of 1,000,000 iterations, retaining every 
10th sample (Gelman et al. 2004) and with a burnin of 50,000. An uninformative prior 
was used on all parameter priors, so the posterior distribution (i.e. parameter estimates 
and predictions) were completely informed by the data. We checked values of the 
Brooks-Gelman-Rubin diagnostic, which indicated chain convergence was achieved. An 
effective sample size of 10,000 was also achieved for each parameter estimate (after 
Kruschke 2015). 
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The regression model for the response variable (de-trended sugar cane yield) dyield at 
time i with a smooth effect (f) for rainfall, max temperature and radiation.  
𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖~𝑁(𝜇𝑖 , 𝜎); 
𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑖 = α + f (rainfalli) + f (max temperaturei) + f (radiationi) + ℇi 
ℇ𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
Efficiency analysis of rainfall index  
Two methods adapted from Adeyinka et al. (2015) and Vedenov and Barnett 2004 were 
used to carry out efficiency analysis. The first, following Adeyinka et al. (2015) uses 
rainfall percentile values and estimates crop losses that are proportional to changes in 
rainfall percentiles. The second, following Vedenov and Barnett (2004) estimates crop 
losses based on regression modelling. Using this method strikes and premiums are 
derived from a probability distribution (as a pure premium of rainfall values and how 
these relate to difference predicted yields from the regression model.  
Calculating premiums from regression model 
Max liability was the max revenue loss predicted from regression model (i.e. the revenue 
anomaly predicted at the maximum rainfall value recorded). The premium is calculated 
as a pure premium (after Chen 2011) where the annual indemnity of the rainfall index 
predicted sugar cane yield from our probability distribution is multiplied by its occurrence 
probability. 
 








Here, P(X) denotes the insurance contract pure premium, n is the number of rainfall 
values in our probability distribution,1/n denotes the probability of each rainfall values 
level and its corresponding indemnity from the rainfall probability distribution, IND 
represents the indemnity amount (adapted from Vedenov and Barnett 2004  & Chen 
2011).  
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Measures of assessing risk 
We assessed risk in four ways, briefly outlined below. The details of these risk efficiency 
measures are provided in appendix 1.  
 Conditional tail expectation (CTE). CTE measures the hedging efficiency of 
insurance at different strike levels (Adeyinka et al. 2015). 
 
 Certainty equivalence revenue (CER). CER accounts for peoples tendency to be 
risk averse and is measure of willingness to pay (Vedenov and Barnett 2004; 
Adeyinka et al. 2015).  
 
 Root mean square loss (RMSL). The RMSL shows the extent to which a contract 
reduces downside risk below the mean is minimised (Vedenov and Barnett 2004).  
 
 Value at risk (VaR). VaR emphasizes the maximum reduction in revenue that will 
not be exceeded at a certain probability (Vedenov and Barnett 2004). 
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4. Survey results 
Results are separately presented for each sector/cropping system (cotton, sugar cane). 
Risk, severity, loss and adaptive response data are summarised by (1) all surveys for 
that system, (2) region and (3) by industry sector accreditation; accredited farms being 
those that used any accredited or self-assessed best management practices (BMPs). 
Results are presented as average values, with error bars that are plus or minus one 
standard error plotted on the average values, for groups. Error bars that overlap indicate 
that any apparent difference between groups is likely to be due to random variation (i.e. 
non-significant); where errors bars are not overlapping, this suggests that there is a 
greater probability that there are significant (non-random) differences between the 
groups, but only at a low level of confidence (ca.67% confidence level). As such, these 
results should be interpreted as indicative. Where no error bar is shown, there was only 
one sample and so uncertainty (standard error) could not be calculated.  
Cotton growers 
General Information  
The size of cotton farms surveyed ranged from 200 to 10,000 ha, with an average area 
of around 1500 ha (Figure 4-1). The average area of cotton planted was around 550 ha, 
while on average around 80% (range: 20-100%) of the area of farms surveyed were 
irrigated (Figure 4-1). 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Summary of general information across all surveyed cotton farms. Values are average 
scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error.  
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There was little notable difference across the regions for farm size, the area of cotton 
planted, or the proportion of crop irrigated (Figure 4-2). Similarly, there was little 
apparent difference between accredited (n = 13, overall) and non-accredited farms (n = 
10) in terms of farm size or area of cotton planted; however, accredited farms appear to 
have somewhat higher levels of irrigation (91.9% ± 6.03%) than non-accredited farms 
(67.9% ± 11.13%) (Figure 4-2). 
  




















Figure 4-2 Averages for general information by (a) cotton growing region (C: Central Queensland; 
DD: Darling Downs; SW: south-west Queensland) and (b) accreditation (Yes: accredited; No: not 
accredited). Values are average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error.  
  
(a) General information by Region 
(b) General information by Accreditation 
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Crop yields 
Cotton crop yields reported by survey participants show significant variation over time 
(Figure 4-3). Visual inspection of yields through time (along with the minimum and 
maximum values) suggests no major differences in crop yields between the Darling 
Downs and Central Queensland regions. Values for the South-west Queensland region 
are not plotted due to insufficient data. There also appears to be little difference in yields 
reported by accredited and non-accredited cotton growers (Figure 4-3).  
 
Figure 4-3 Survey participants’ reported cotton yields by year for (a) the Darling Downs and Central 
Queensland region and (b) non-accredited and accredited cotton growers. Insufficient data is 
available for the south west Queensland region. Black line is average yield and the shaded 
coloured area represents the range (minimum–maximum) of reported yields for that year.  
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Risk 
Perceived likelihood of risk 
The risks with the greatest overall perceived likelihood of occurring were lack of rain 
during the season (mean score: 3.4; range: 2–5), lack of rain at planting (mean: 3.0; 
range: 1–5) and hail (mean: 2.9; range: 2–4) (Figure 4-4). Overall the risks perceived to 
be the least likely to occur were gin breakdown (mean: 1.1; range: 1–2), malicious 
damage (mean: 1.2; range 1–4) and fire (mean: 1.2; range: 1–3) (Figure 4-4).  
 The perceived likelihood of risks was consistent across the regions (Figure 4-5).  
 The perceived likelihood of risk was similar for most risks across accredited and 
non-accredited farms (Figure 4-6); however, the perceived likelihood of excess 
rain at planting, over-spray and frost were slightly higher for non-accredited 
farms compared to accredited farms (Figure 4-6).  
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Figure 4-4 Overall perceived likelihood of risk amongst Queensland cotton farmers. Values are 
average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
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Figure 4-5 Perceived likelihood of risk across Queensland cotton regions. Values are average 
scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. C=Central Queensland, DD=Darling Downs, SW=South 
West Queensland. 
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Figure 4-6 Perceived likelihood of risk by accredited (Yes) and non-accredited (No) cotton growers. 
Values are average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
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Perceived severity of risk 
Overall the risks with greatest perceived severity were flood (mean score: 4.0; range: 1–
5), excess rain during harvest (3.5; 2–5), lack of rain during season (3.2; 1–5), hail 
(3.2; 1–5) and excess of rain during season (3.0; 1–4) (Figure 4-7). The risks with the 
lowest overall perceived severity were gin breakdown (1.4; 1–3), frost (1.3; 1–2), 
malicious damage (1.2; 1–5) and fire (1.2; 1–2) (Figure 4-7).  
 The perceived severity of most risks was similar across regions (Figure 4-7). 
Perceptions of the severity of excess of rain during the season were on average 
slightly greater amongst the Central region cotton growers (3.4 ± 0.74) than on 
the Darling Downs (2.6 ± 0.70) (Figure 4-8).  
 The perceived severity of most risks was similar across accredited and non-
accredited farms (Figure 10). Excess rain during the season was perceived to be a 
greater risk amongst accredited cotton growers (3.2 ± 0.80) than amongst those 
who were not accredited (2.6 ± 0.88) (Figure 4-9).  
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Figure 4-7 Overall perceived severity of risk amongst Queensland cotton farmers. Values are 
average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
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Figure 4-8 Perceived severity of risk across Queensland cotton regions. Values are average scores; 
error bars are ±1 one standard error. C=Central Queensland, DD=Darling Downs, SW=South West 
Queensland. 
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Figure 4-9 Perceived severity of risk by accredited (Yes) and non-accredited (No) cotton growers. 
Values are average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
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Estimated losses due to specific risks 
Overall, the risk perceived to cause the greatest potential loss (with estimated impacts of 
20% or more on farm productivity/profitability) was flooding, with a mean estimated loss 
of almost 50% (ranging from 10–90%). The next most costly event identified was hail, 
with estimated losses ranging from 5 to 80 %, followed by fire (0–80%) and lack of rain 
at planting and during the season (up to 65% and 70%, respectively)  (Table 4-1).  
 
Table 4-1 Estimates of losses by risk category amongst Queensland cotton growers. 
Risk n Mean ± SE Range 
Lack of rain at planting 7 27.1 ± 7.39 5–65 
Excess rain at planting 4 10.0 ± 2.04 5–15 
Lack of rain during season 13 25.8 ± 5.37 10–70 
Excess rain during season 10 19.5 ± 2.52 10–35 
Excess rain during harvest 11 24.1 ± 2.85 10–40 
Hail 10 30.0 ± 7.49 5–80 
Fire 3 28.33 ± 25.87 0–80 
Frost 2 5.0 ± 0.00 5–5 
Overspray 1 5.0 - 
Pest 3 5.0 ± 0.00 5–5 
Flood 16 48.4 ± 6.20 10–90 
Malicious Damage 0 - - 
Marketing of crops 2 10.0 ± 0.00 10–10 
Price 3 18.3 ± 4.41 10–25 
Gin breakdown 1 0.0 - 
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By region, the most costly events (with estimated impacts of 20% or more on farm 
productivity/profitability) were: 
 in Central Queensland, flood, hail, excess rain during harvest and lack of rain at 
planting, with individual growers reporting impacts of up to 80 and 90% for hail 
and flood damage (Table 4-2); 
 for Darling Downs cotton growers, flood, lack of rain during the season, lack of 
rain during planting, excess rain during harvest and lack of rain at planting; one 
grower reported losing 80% of annual revenue due to fire (Table 4-2); and  
 in south-west Queensland, flood, excess rain during the season and during 
harvest, and hail (Table 4-2). 
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Table 4-2 Cotton growers’ estimates of losses by risk category across Queensland cotton growing regions. 
Risk Central Queensland  Darling Downs  S-w Queensland 
 n Mean ± SE Range  n Mean ± SE Range  n Mean ± SE Range 
Lack of rain at planting 4 21.3 ± 5.91 5–30  3 35.0 ± 16.07 10–65  0 - - 
Excess rain at planting 1 10.0 -  3 10.0 ± 2.89 5–15  0 - - 
Lack of rain during 
season 
6 19.2 ± 3.27 10–30  5 42.5 ± 13.77 10–70  3 16.7 ± 6.67 10–30 
Excess rain during 
season 
5 20.0 ± 4.74 10–35  2 15.0 ± 5.0 10–20  3 21.7 ± 1.67 20–25 
Excess rain during 
harvest 
5 23.0 ± 5.15 10–40  4 27.5 ± 4.79 20-40  2 20.0 ± 0.00 20–20 
Hail 5 43.0 ± 11.36 10–80  2 12.5 ± 7.50 5–20  3 20.0 ± 10.00 10–40 
Fire 1 5.0 -  2 40.0 ± 40.00 0–80  0 - - 
Frost 1 5.0 -  1 5.0 -  0 - - 
Overspray 0 - -  1 5.0 -  0 - - 
Pest 1 5.0 -  2 5.0 ± 0.00 5–5  0 - - 
Flood 6 47.5 ± 12.09 10–90  7 55.7 ± 8.34 20–80  3 33.3 ± 12.02 10–50 
Malicious Damage 0 - -  0 - -  0 - - 
Marketing of crops 0 - -  2 10.0 ± 0.00 10–10  0 - - 
Price 1 20.0 -  2 17.5 ± 7.50 10–25  0 - - 
Gin breakdown 0 - -  1 0 -  0 - - 
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Accredited growers were more likely to be able/willing to provide estimates of losses due 
to particular events. There was little apparent difference between these groups in terms 
of the estimates of impact on farm productivity and profitability (Table 4-3).  
 
Table 4-3 Accredited and non-accredited cotton growers’ estimates of losses by risk category. 
Risk Accredited  Not accredited 
 n Mean ± SE Range  n Mean ± SE Range 
Lack of rain at 
planting 
7 27.1 ± 7.39 5–65  0 - - 
Excess rain at 
planting 
4 10.0 ± 2.04 5–15  0 - - 
Lack of rain during 
season 
10 26.5 ± 6.83 10–70  3 23.3 ± 6.67 10-30 
Excess rain during 
season 
7 17.1 ± 2.64 10–25  3 25.0 ± 5.00 20–35 
Excess rain during 
harvest 
7 24.3 ± 3.52 10-40  4 23.8 ± 5.54 15–40 




Fire 3 28.3 ± 25.87 0-80  0 - - 
Frost 1 5 -  1 5 - 
Overspray 1 5 -  0 - - 
Pest 3 5 ± 0 5–5  0 - - 
Flood 10 47.5 ± 8.34 10–90  6 50 ± 9.92 10–75 
Malicious Damage 0 - -  0 - - 
Marketing of crops 2 10.0 ± 0 10–10  0 - - 
Price 3 18.3 ± 4.41 10–25  0 - - 
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Risk management practices 
The most frequently reported risk management practices adopted by Queensland cotton 
growers were reported (by >85% of survey participants) to be irrigation, soil testing and 
agronomic advice, specialised planting techniques and reduced tillage (Table 4-4). 
Insurance and adoption of BMPs were the least utilised risk management tools, with 61% 
and 57%, respectively, of growers reporting using these (Table 4-4).  
Table 4-4 Proportion of Queensland cotton growers reporting use of risk management practices. 
(Practices are ranked according to the frequency reported.) 
Risk n % using Rank 
Irrigation 23 100.0 1 
Soil testing agronomic advice 23 100.0 1 
Planting techniques 23 95.7 2 
Reduced tillage 23 87.0 3 
Soil moisture monitoring 23 82.6 4 
Special varieties 23 82.6 4 
Futures contracts 23 81.8 5 
Weather forecasts 21 81.0 6 
Laser levelling 23 78.3 7 
Insurance 23 60.9 8 
BMPs 23 56.5 9 
 
Based on the survey responses, the greatest adoption of risk management practices 
appears to occur amongst Central Queensland cotton growers and least amongst those in 
southwest Queensland (Figure 4-10). However, insurance uptake in the Central 
Queensland region appears to be relatively low at 50% of growers, as is adoption of 
BMPs on the Darling Downs at 30% of growers surveyed (Figure 4-10).  
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Figure 4-10 Percentage of Queensland cotton farms by regions using different risk management 
tools. CQ=Central Queensland (n=8), DD=Darling Downs (n=10), SWQ=S-w Queensland (n=5). 
In general, a higher proportion of accredited farms reported using use risk management 
tools, although this did not appear to be the case for insurance products or weather 
information (Figure 4-11). 
 
Figure 4-11 Proportion of Queensland cotton farms using different risk management tools by 
Accreditation. (Accredited: n = 13; Not accredited: n = 10). 
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Sugarcane growers  
General Information  
The size of sugar cane farms surveyed ranged from 34 to 800 ha, with an average area 
of around 220 hectares (Figure 4-12). The average area of cane planted was around 150 
ha, while on average just over 55% (range: 0–100%) of the area of farms surveyed were 
irrigated (Figure 4-12).  
 
 
Figure 4-12 Summary of general information across all surveyed sugar cane farms. Values are 
average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
There was little notable difference across the regions for farm size or the area of sugar 
cane planted (Figure 4-13). There was no irrigated sugar cane production reported in the 
northern sugar cane growing region, while just over 50% of farm areas in the central 
region were irrigated, and most (around 90%) farm areas were irrigated in the south 
(Figure 4-13). There was little apparent difference between accredited (n = 18, overall) 
and non-accredited farms (n = 14) in terms of farm size, area of sugar cane planted or 
percent of the crop irrigated (Figure 4-13), nor between irrigated (n = 18) and non-
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Figure 4-13 Summary of general information across surveyed sugar cane farms by (a) region (North, 
Central, South), (b) BMP accreditation (No: not accredited; Yes: accredited) and (c) irrigation use 
(No: not irrigated; Yes: irrigated). Values are average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
  
(b) General information by Accreditation 
(c) General information by Irrigation use 
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Crop data - yields 
Sugar cane crop yields reported by survey participants show significant variation over 
time (Figure 4-14). Yields for the Central sugar cane growing region were not plotted due 
to insufficient data (n = 1). Visual inspection of yields through time (along with the 
minimum and maximum values) suggests little difference in average crop yields between 
the southern and northern region, but far greater spread (i.e. variability) in reported 
yields across the southern region (Figure 4-14); this could in part be a result of different 
numbers of samples in each of these regions (North: n = 3; South: n = 7). Similarly, 
little difference in reported sugar cane yields was evident between irrigated (n = 8) and 
non-irrigated farms (n = 3) (Figure 4-14), or between accredited (n = 6) and non-
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Figure 4-14 Survey participants’ reported sugar cane yields by year for (a) Northern and Southern 
sugar cane cropping regions; (b) non-irrigated and irrigated; and (c) non-accredited and accredited. 
The black line is average yield and the coloured areas represent the range (i.e. minimum–
maximum) in reported yields for that year.  





Perceived likelihood of risk 
The risks with the greatest overall perceived likelihood of occurring were excess rain 
during harvest (mean score: 3.5; range: 1–5); mill breakdown (3.5; 1–5); and prices 
(3.4; 1–5) (Figure 4-15). Overall the risks perceived to be the least likely to occur were 
overspray (1.3; 1–3); hail (1.4; 1–4); and frost (1.5; 1–4) (Figure 4-15).  
 The perceived likelihood of most risks was consistent across the regions (Figure 
4-16); although, compared to the other regions, in the north the perceived 
likelihood of a lack of rain during season was lower, while the perceived likelihood 
of cyclone and malicious damage was higher (Figure 4-16).  
 The perceived likelihood of risk was also similar for most risks across accredited 
and non-accredited farms (Figure 4-17); however, the perceived likelihood of 
excess rain at planting and flood were slightly higher for accredited farms 
compared to non-accredited farms, while the perceived likelihood of risks 
associated with prices was greater for non-accredited compared to accredited 
farms (Figure 4-17). 
 The perceived likelihood of risk was mostly consistent across irrigated and non-
irrigated farms (Figure 4-18). 
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Figure 4-15 Overall perceived likelihood of risk amongst Queensland sugar cane farmers. Values 
are average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
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Figure 4-16 Perceived likelihood of risk across Queensland sugar cane cropping regions. Values are 
average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
University of Southern Queensland | DCAP06 Crop Insurance 65 
 
 
Figure 4-17 Perceived likelihood of risk by accreditation status (No: not accredited; Yes: 
accredited). Values are average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
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Figure 4-18 Perceived likelihood of risk by irrigation use (No: not irrigated; Yes: irrigated). Values 
are average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
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Perceived severity of risk 
Overall the risks with greatest perceived severity were cyclone (mean score: 3.9; range: 
1–5) and mill breakdown (3.8; 2–5) (Figure 4-19). The risks with the lowest overall 
perceived severity were overspray (1.6; 1–4) and hail (1.9; 1–5) (Figure 4-19).  
 The perceived severity of most risks was similar across regions (Figure 4-20). 
However, in the north, the perceived severity of cyclone (4.6 ± 0.15) and 
malicious damage (3.1 ± 0.44) were higher and frost (1.3 ± 0.21) was lower than 
in other regions. Flooding was seen as a higher severity risk (4.6 ± 0.26) in the 
south than in other regions. Fire was seen as a lower severity risk (2.8 ± 0.28) in 
the central region than in other regions (Figure 4-20). 
 The perceived severity of most risks was similar across both accredited and non-
accredited farms (Figure 4-21).  
 There was also little difference in the perceived severity of most risks across 
irrigated and non-irrigated farms; although the perceived severity of flood and 
frost were higher on irrigated compared to non-irrigated farms and lack of rain at 
planting and malicious damage was seen as a more severe risk in non-irrigated 
compared to irrigated farms (Figure 4-22).  
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Figure 4-19 Overall perceived severity of risk on Queensland sugar cane farms. Values are average 
scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
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Figure 4-20 Perceived severity of risk by Queensland sugar cane farming region. Values are average 
scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
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Figure 4-21 Perceived severity of risk by accreditation (No: not accredited; Yes: accredited) on 
Queensland sugar cane farms. Values are average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
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Figure 4-22 Perceived severity risk by irrigation use (No: not irrigated; Yes: irrigated) on 
Queensland sugar cane farms. Values are average scores; error bars are ±1 one standard error. 
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Estimated losses due to specific risks 
Overall the risk perceived to cause the greatest potential loss (with estimated impacts of 
20% or more on farm productivity/profitability) was cyclone, with a mean estimated loss 
of almost 50% (ranging from 0–75%). The next most costly events identified were sugar 
cane price (with estimated losses ranging from 5 to 60 %); flood (0–60%); pests (10–
60%); excess rain at planting (7–70%); excess rain during harvest (3–60%); and fire 
(1–60%) (Table 4-5).  
Table 4-5 Estimates of losses by risk category amongst Queensland sugar cane growers 
Risk n Mean ± SE Range 
Lack of rain at planting 13 13.5 ± 2.85 0–30 
Excess rain at planting 16 25.0 ± 4.81 5–70 
Lack of rain during season 12 21.9 ± 4.12 3–50 
Excess rain during season 13 18.5 ± 2.57 1–30 
Excess rain during harvest 16 23.9 ± 3.32 3–60 
Frost 8 13.5 ± 8.26 0–60 
Hail 8 4.6 ± 2.52 0–20 
Fire 12 23.8 ± 6.00 1–60 
Flood 14 26.4 ± 6.58 0–60 
Cyclone 12 48.8 ± 6.63 0–75 
Overspray 5 2.4 ± 1.12 0–5 
Malicious Damage 6 17.7 ± 16.49 0–100 
Pests & diseases 12 26.3 ± 4.81 10–60 
Prices 10 32.0 ± 4.84 5–60 
Mill breakdown 11 19.1 ± 2.68 5–30 
Marketing 8 2.6 ± 0.56 1–5 
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By region, the most costly events (with estimated average impacts of 20% or more on 
farm productivity/profitability) were: 
 in North Queensland, malicious damage (with individual growers reporting impacts 
up to 100%), prices (40%), fire (60%) and excess rain at planting, during the 
season and at harvest (50%, 30% and 30%, respectively) (Table 4-6); 
 in Central Queensland, prices (up to 60% losses); pests and diseases (60%), 
excess rain at planting and at harvest (70% and 30%, respectively) but lack of 
rain during the season (50%) (Table 4-6); and 
 in southern Queensland, flood (60%), cyclone (40%), fire (40%) and excess rain 
at planting and at harvest (both up to 60%) (Table 4-6).  
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Table 4-6 Sugar cane growers’ estimates of losses by risk category across Queensland sugar cane growing regions. 
Risk North  Central  South 
 n Mean ± SE Range  n Mean ± SE Range  n Mean ± SE Range 
Lack of rain at planting 3 15.0 ± 5.00 5–20  8 12.5 ± 4.33 0–30  2 15.0 ± 5.00 10–20 
Excess rain at planting 3 26.7 ± 12.02 10–50  9 23.3 ± 6.61 5–70  4 27.5 ± 11.09 10–60 
Lack of rain during season 2 20.0 ± 0.00 20–20  9 22.6 ± 5.57 3–50  1 20.0 - 
Excess rain during season 3 25.0 ± 2.89 20–30  9 15.7 ± 3.21 1–30  1 25.0 - 
Excess rain during harvest 3 26.7 ± 3.33 20–30  10 20.3 ± 3.14 3-30  3 33.3 ± 14.53 10–60 
Frost 1 0.0 -  7 15.1 ± 9.28 0–60  0 - - 
Hail 2 10.5 ± 9.50 1–20  6 2.67 ± 1.67 0–10  0 - - 
Fire 3 38.3 ± 16.91 5–60  8 16.4 ± 5.52 1–50  1 40.0 - 
Flood 3 16.7 ± 14.24 0–45  7 15.7 ± 8.12 0–60  4 52.5 ± 2.50 50–60 
Cyclone 1 5.0 -  2 5.0 ± 0.00 5–5  1 40.0 - 
Overspray 2 1.0 ± 1.00 0–2  3 3.3 ± 1.67 0–5  0 - - 
Malicious Damage 2 50.5 ± 49.50 1–100  4 1.3 ± 1.25 0–5  0 - - 
Pests & diseases 3 16.7 ± 6.67 10–30  7 32.1 ± 7.23 10–60  2 20.0 ± 0.00 20–20 
Prices 3 30.0 ± 5.77 20–40  6 34.2 ± 7.79 5–60  1 25.0 - 
Mill breakdown 3 15.0 ± 5.00 5–20  8 20.6 ± 3.20 5–30  0 - - 
Marketing 2 3.5 ± 0.50 3–4  5 2.0 ± 0.77 1–5  1 4.0 - 
University of Southern Queensland | DCAP06 Crop Insurance 75 
 
There was little apparent difference between accredited and non-accredited sugar cane 
growers in terms of estimated losses for many of the risks covered in this study, 
although non-accredited sugar cane farmers appear more likely than accredited farmers 
to experience/perceive greater estimated impact on farm productivity and profitability 
due to events such as lack of rain during the season, frost, fire and malicious damage 
(Table 4-7).  
 
Table 4-7 Accredited and non-accredited sugar cane growers’ estimates of losses by risk category 
Risk Accredited  Not accredited 
 n Mean ± SE Range  n Mean ± SE Range 
Lack of rain at planting 4 6.25 ± 1.25 5–10  9 16.7 ± 3.63 0–30 
Excess rain at planting 6 27.5 ± 11.95 5–70  10 23.5 ± 3.66 5–30 
Lack of rain during 
season 
6 13.8 ± 2.95 3–20  6 30.0 ± 6.32 20–50 
Excess rain during 
season 
6 17.7 ± 4.84 1–30  7 19.29 ± 2.77 5–30 
Excess rain during 
harvest 
7 23.3 ± 7.26 3-60  9 24.4 ± 2.42 10–30 
Frost 2 3.0 ± 2.00 1–5  6 16.7 ± 10.85 0-60 
Hail 3 4.0 ± 3.00 1-10  5 5.0 ± 3.87 0–20 
Fire 5 12.2 ± 7.10 1–40  7 32.1 ± 7.86 5–60 
Flood 5 29.0 ± 11.00 5–60  9 25.0 ± 8.66 0–60 
Cyclone 7 47.1 ± 7.14 20–70  5 51.0 ± 13.45 0–75 
Overspray 1 2.0 -  4 2.5 ± 1.44 0–5 
Malicious Damage 2 3.0 ± 2.00 1–5  4 25.0 ± 25.00 0–100 
Pests & diseases 5 22.0 ± 7.35 10–50  7 29.3 ± 6.59 10–60 
Prices 3 38.3 ± 7.26 25–50  7 29.3 ± 6.21 5–60 
Mill breakdown 4 18.8 ± 5.15 5–30  7 19.3 ± 3.35 5–30 
Marketing 4 3.8 ± 0.63 2–5  4 1.5± 0.50 1–3- 
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Between sugar cane farmers, those that farm under irrigation were more likely to 
experience/perceive greater estimated impact on farm productivity and profitability due 
to events such as flood, pests and diseases, frost, price and mill breakdown, while 
dryland sugar cane farmers experienced/perceived more significant losses due to lack of 
rain during the growing season, malicious damage and fire (Table 4-8).  
 
Table 4-8 Farmers’ estimates of losses by risk category for irrigated and non-irrigated sugar cane 
farms 
Risk Irrigated  Not irrigated 
 n Mean ± SE Range  n Mean ± SE Range 
Lack of rain at planting 7 10.0 ± 2.67 5–20  6 17.5 ± 5.12 0–30 
Excess rain at planting 10 25.5 ± 6.85 5–70  6 24.2 ± 6.64 5–50 
Lack of rain during 
season 
10 14.7 ± 2.64 3–20  5 32.0 ± 7.35 20-50 
Excess rain during 
season 
7 17.3 ± 3.96 1–30  6 20.0 ± 3.42 5–30 
Excess rain during 
harvest 
10 25.3 ± 5.06 3–60  6 21.7 ± 3.07 10–30 
Hail 3 5.3 ± 2.60 1–10  5 4.2 ± 3.95 0-20 
Fire 6 18.5 ± 8.56 1–50  6 29.2 ± 8.60 5–60 
Frost 4 26.5 ± 14.19 1–60  4 0.0 ± 0.00 - 
Cyclone 6 45.0 ± 7.64 20–70  6 52.5 ± 11.38 0–75 
Overspray 0 - -  5 2.4 ± 1.12 0–5 
Pests & disease 6 34.2 ± 8.21 10–60  6 18.3 ± 3.07 10–30 
Flood 8 40.0 ± 7.07 10–60  6 8.3 ± 7.38 0–45 
Malicious Damage 1 5.0 -  5 20.2 ± 19.95 0–100 
Price 4 41.3 ± 8.26 25–60  6 25.8 ± 4.90 5–40 
Marketing of crops 3 3.7 ± 0.88 2–5  5 2.0 ± 0.63 1–4 
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Risk management practices 
The most frequently reported risk management practices adopted by Queensland sugar 
cane farmers were reported (by >75% of survey participants) to be soil testing and 
agronomic advice, reduced tillage, insurance and futures contracts (Table 4-9). Least 
used were soil moisture monitoring (31% of farmers), while none of the surveyed farms 
used risk management systems (Table 4-9).  
 
Table 4-9 Proportion of Queensland sugar cane farmers reporting use of risk management 
practices. (Practices are ranked according to the frequency reported.) 
Risk n % using Rank 
Soil testing agro advice 32 100.0 1 
Reduced tillage 32 87.5 2 
Insurance 32 81.3 3 
Futures contracts 31 75.0 4 
Planting techniques 31 68.8 5 
Laser levelling 32 62.5 6 
Sub surface drainage 32 56.3 7 
Weather forecasts 31 56.3 8 
Special varieties 29 46.9 9 
Soil moisture monitoring  32 31.3 10 
Risk management 
system 
31 0.0 11 
 
Based on the survey responses, the greatest adoption of risk management practices 
appears to occur amongst central Queensland sugar cane farmers (including insurance 
uptake) and least amongst those in southern Queensland (Figure 4-23).  
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Figure 4-23 Percentage of Queensland sugar cane farms within regions using different risk 
management tools. North=North Queensland (n=13), Central=Central Queensland (n=11), 
South=Southern Queensland (n=8). 
There appears to be very little difference between accredited and non-accredited sugar 
cane farms in the frequency of use of risk management practices/tools (Figure 4-24). 
 
 
Figure 4-24 Proportion of sugar cane farms using different risk management tools by accreditation. 
(Accredited: n = 18; Not accredited: n = 14). 
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In general, a higher proportion of irrigated sugar cane farms reported using specialised 
cultivation techniques, while non-irrigated farms were more likely to employ subsurface 
drainage and weather/climate information. The reported use of insurance products was 
similar for both groups (Figure 4-25). 
 
 
Figure 4-25 Proportion of sugar cane farms using different risk management tools by irrigation. 
(Irrigated: n = 14; Not irrigated: n = 18). 
 
Crop risk insurance 
Of the crop insurance products currently available to Queensland cotton and sugar cane 
farmers, fire and hail cover appear to be the most commonly utilised. Both groups 
indicated that they might be prepared to take out insurance to cover either the costs of 
production, the value of production or a level of income (Table 4-10). 
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Table 4-10 Current uptake of insurance products amongst Queensland cotton and sugar cane 
farmers and preferred insurance cover/products.  
CROP Current insurance – 
risks (number of 
respondents) 
Preferred insurance - 
risks 
Preferred insurance – 
value (number of 
respondents) 
Cotton Hail (15)  
Fire (2)  
Colour downgrade (1)  
No insurance (8) 




Rain at harvest  
Quality downgrade.  
No insurance (5)  
Income (5) 
Production value (7) 
Production costs (6) 
Nominated amount (5) 
Sugarcane Fire (27) 
Hail (11) 
Flood (1) 









Disease & Pests 
Mill performance 
Price 
No insurance (8) 
Income (8) 
Production value (7) 
Production costs (15) 
Nominated amount (3) 
 
Survey conclusions 
While numbers of farmers participating in this survey were low, especially when we 
started to look at responses across regions and accreditation/irrigation groups within 
these industry sectors, the results provide indication of some interesting regional 
patterns and variations across risk management types and production systems. Key 
messages are that current insurance products available to Queensland farmers 
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(specifically, cotton and sugar cane farmers) may not address critical risks to the 
production and/or profitability of these systems and that farmers would prefer to have 
comprehensive insurance products available that cover them against profitability losses 
across multiple risk factors.  
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5. Crop modelling results 
Data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (http://www.abs.gov.au) for wheat, 
sorghum and cotton over the 1999-2015 (1998/1999 – 2014/2015) period were used for 
the performance assessment of our simulations. These data are at different scales (i.e. 
statistical units) due to their availability: provincial level: 1999-2007; statistical division 
(SD) level: 2008-2010, and statistical area level 4 (SA4) level: 2011-2015. Thus, yield 
data at provincial and SD scales were assigned to the relevant SA4 for the periods 1999-
2007 and 2008-2010, respectively. 
Regarding sugarcane, data from the sugar-producing regions for the 1975-2014 period 
were used as observed data. Although such data encompass several sugar varieties, 
different soil types and crop management practices across a given region, they are more 
suitable to capture an overall picture in a given region. 
For each site, an average total number of 400 cotton combinations of management 
practices were simulated using APSIM and DSSAT. For sugarcane 27 combinations were 
simulated for each of the sites. The main simulation outputs are lint, bale and seed 
yields for cotton (no bale yield for DSSAT); and cane yield and sucrose for sugarcane 
(the CCS was also simulated in case of APSIM). 
For a given crop, the simulated output assigned to the ensemble of crop models is the 
mean of the values from the 2 models used, e.g., 
  𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐸𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑙𝑒 =
1
2
(𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐴𝑃𝑆𝐼𝑀 + 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑇)). 
A series of graphs showing some examples of the year-to-year variability of observed 
regional and simulated yields for selected sites is presented in Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2. 
Regarding the simulated data in these figures all the possible combinations for a given 
criteria are plotted. 
Depending on the site and crop, there is a trend to yield overestimation or 
underestimation when comparing the observed regional yields to the predicted ones. 
Here models are applied in environments for which they have not been specifically 
calibrated, which is typically the situation in such impact studies at larger spatial scales 
(regional to national scales). 
 




Figure 5-1 Lint yield at Dalby (left) and Goondiwindi (right). PAWC = 150 and 100 mm, for Dalby and Goondiwindi, respectively. 
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Figure 5-2 Year to year variability of observed and predicted sugar cane yield at Bundaberg (left) and Burdekin (right). Predicted values show the result of 
all possible combinations (management factors detailed in methods section) using the models APSIM and DSSAT. The Ensemble yield is the mean of the 
two simulated yields. 
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6. Climate assessment risk and reporting 
tool - Risk Quantification and data 
presentation 
A ‘climate and agricultural risk assessment and reporting tool’ (prototype) was developed 
as part of the project. The tool can be accessed through http://icacs.usq.edu.au/risk/ , 
but is currently password protected. This ‘tool’ allows quantification of key climate risks, 
initially for sugar and cotton industry.  The key risks included in the tools are rainfall, 
frost, heat (temperature), cyclone, yield and hail (see screen shots provided in Figure 
6-1, Figure 6-2, Figure 6-3, Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5 below). 
The tool provides an option to generate a detail climate risk report based on historical 
data and future seasonal climate forecast for an individual location. The tool data also 
serves as a dataset portal, allowing for the download of data in a required template. The 
data sharing portal was used to share data with Willis Tower Watson (WTW) and 
Queensland Farmers Federation (QFF) to design innovative index based agricultural 
insurance products. 
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Figure 6-1 Climate risk analysis interface where locations can be selected  
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Figure 6-2 Climate risk analysis interface showing the different risk options that can be assessed for 
the Dalby post office station  
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Figure 6-3 Climate risk analysis interface where different time periods can be selected  
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7. Insurance products – worked example on 
insurance products and their benefits  
Insurance Products and Value Related Aspects 
In this section we address the potential insurance products available from the insurance 
market that provide coverage against the key risks identified by sugarcane and cotton 
farmers.  The concepts outlined herein are equally applicable to producers of other crops 
in any geographical region.     
Willis Towers Watson’s (WTW) collective resources – in Australia and the UK – have 
many years of experience in arranging adverse weather covers for a range of different 
industries, spanning the agribusiness, power, construction and entertainment sectors 
among others.  This expertise can be harnessed to structure and execute the protections 
outlined in this paper.  WTW likewise possess the actuarial and analytical resources 
required to support the recommendations in this report and are well placed to provide 
stakeholders with a full understanding of the potential risk transfer options. 
Overview of the role of insurance 
The payment of insurance premiums whether it be for one’s home, possessions, car, 
business or even life may not be an expense that is always greatly appreciated.  Yet few 
who chose to make such a payment would doubt the benefit of the coverage it provides. 
Insurance – in one form or another – can trace its roots back through to trading systems 
of ancient (pre-Minoan) civilisations.  The industry as we know it became more formally 
established following the Great Fire of London in 1666 and the development of insurance 
trading in Edward Lloyd's coffee shop in 1688. It was underpinned by the maxim that 
“the misfortunes of the few fall light upon the many”. 
Today insurance is an essential part of everyday life, playing a crucial role in both 
economic development as well as in supporting wider societal ends. Insurance helps oil 
the engine of the economy and it is impossible to conceive of commerce and civil society 
today without insurance playing its role. 
Aside from the basics of issuing contracts of insurance and paying claims when called 
upon to do so, the insurance industry performs a broader role than is sometimes 
realised.  For example in: 
 Efficiently protecting the public through innovative risk management techniques. 
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o acting as an agent for the promotion and, implementation of risk reduction 
standards 
 Freeing up businesses and professionals from everyday risks and encouraging 
innovation and competition. 
o thereby protecting jobs 
o providing confidence and stability to promote growth and technological 
progress 
 Relieving the burden from the state and providing comfort to individuals by 
providing safe, effective and affordable pension savings, protection and products 
that convert pension savings into retirement income 
o insurance companies are amongst the largest investors in any economy. 
The insurance industry 
The insurance industry is highly stratified in its structure, it is functionally divided into 
risk takers (insurance and reinsurance companies), sales and distribution (insurance 
brokers and agents) and service providers (loss adjusters and risk management experts).  
The assumption of insurance risk typically cascades down a chain of risk takers: starting 
with the insurance company that issues the original policy.  In turn that insurance 
company may choose to share some of that risk either with another insurance company 
or to protect its overall portfolio of assumed risks in various ways.  This is achieved by a 
reinsurance contact - the insurance of an insurance company - by a reinsurance 
company.  Indeed reinsurance companies may seek to protect themselves in the same 
way using a process known as retrocession. 
Insurance globally is a highly regulated industry.  This regulation is intended to protect 
the consumer by ensuring that the insurance company is able to fulfil its obligation and 
remain solvent even under the most extreme set of claim events.  This solvency is 
referenced against a level of capital requirements according to the nature and amount of 
risk assumed by the company.  The purchase of reinsurance by an insurance company 
enables it to assume more risk than would otherwise be permissible under the standard 
of regulated capital adequacy by passing the obligations that exceed its capital to the 
reinsurer. 
It is sometimes the case that insurance businesses, be they insurer, reinsurer, broker or 
agent are loosely referred to as ‘insurance companies’.  As can be seen, this is strictly-
speaking not the case.  This only matters to the extent that a buyer of insurance should 
be aware (or be made aware) of which is the entity that is financially responsible for 
paying his or her claim. 
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Companies within the insurance sector, as with other financial services’ companies, 
include generalists and specialists: the largest of the insurance and reinsurance 
businesses may have both.  It is not surprising perhaps that agricultural insurance is a 
specialist line of business: whereas there may be hundreds of general insurance 
businesses dealing with commonly purchased insurances (e.g. household, motor, 
commercial, travel etc.), there are very few businesses that specialise in agriculture. 
Agricultural insurance: a brief history 
With so much to merit the history of general insurance, agricultural insurance has also 
played its part albeit perhaps more discretely.  It is not known precisely when the first 
agricultural insurance policies were issued but there is evidence of local mutual insurers 
being formed in the 17th century in Europe.  But it was not until the 1900s and especially 
the 1930s when the US Federal Crop Insurance programme was established.  Since that 
time, especially through the last quarter of the 20th century, crop insurance has 
established itself in every major agricultural economy across the globe. 
During this period of development and expansion of crop insurance around the world, a 
number of themes have become evident.  These themes perhaps reflect the underlying 
challenges and complexity of implementing agricultural, as opposed to more traditional, 
types of insurance.  While there are many types of specialist insurance that require 
subject-matter expertise for underwriting and policy administration, agriculture is 
perhaps exceptional in its geographic dispersion.  It therefore requires that the insurers 
involve, or the service providers have, sufficient resources to visit farms either for pre-
underwriting (risk assessment) or claims handling.  Under circumstances in which there 
may be many thousands of insureds spread thinly over a wide area, this presents not 
only a logistical challenge but also, critically, an economic one.  How can the cost of 
these resources be paid for within a potentially modest base of premium?  Globally there 
are few examples of successful agricultural insurance schemes that have emerged 
spontaneously without some form cross-subsidisation of the cost of introducing and 
maintaining the necessary infrastructure. 
It is a matter of simple observation that where agricultural insurance exists at any scale, 
some degree of subsidy is provided either at local, regional or state level.  The extent 
and manner of such subsidy may vary but it would be appear to be the catalysing 
component of crop insurance wherever it exists.  Needless to say, it is not necessarily a 
panacea and poorly performing crop insurance programmes can be introduced 
notwithstanding with the benefit of substantial subsidised support. 
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Crop insurance in Australia 
In Australia this chicken-and-egg situation has hampered the emergence and widespread 
take-up of crop insurance.  Multi-peril products were first offered in Australia during the 
1970s but ultimately they did not flourish as a result of a detrimental cycle of adverse 
selection, poor results and increasing premium costs. 
Since that time a number of insurance companies and agencies have continued to offer 
products, especially so-called named peril coverage e.g. for example hail or frost.  In 
addition other offerings are available such as farm level yield cover for broadacre crops 
and index-based products.  The latter being relatively new to the market and, as 
discussed further, representing promising potential for development. 
Australian farmers are not widespread adopters of crop insurance despite the fact that 
agriculture in Australia faces some of the greatest weather-related challenges of any 
developed farming economy.  In simple economic terms, this suggests that the cost of 
insurance has not yet reached an amount at which supply and demand are reasonably 
satisfied. 
Australian Crop Insurance Providers 
 
Achmea  Leading Dutch based agricultural and horticultural insurer offering tailored 
winter crop insurance.  Leader in greenhouse insurance. 
AgriRisk Broker offering MPCI for broadacre crops and defined perils cover for 
cotton. 
MPCI  Underwriting Agent for Liberty Speciality Markets (Lloyds division), offering 
MPCI for broadacre crops. 
Latevo Formally agent of Assetinsure offering MPCI for broadacre crops. 
SureSeason Authorised Representative of Ironshore Australia (Lloyds’ security) offering 
revenue MPCI cover. 
Primacy Agent of Allianz offering MPCI or defined perils cover for broadacre crops; 
specified perils cover for cotton and horticulture crops. 
Rural Affinity Agent of Great Lakes offering defined perils (including additional benefits) 
cover for broadacre, cotton and horticulture crops. 
IAG/WFI/CGU Offer defined perils (including additional benefits) cover for broadacre, 
sugarcane and cotton crops. 
 MPCI pilot programme (Crop Income Protection) for wheat, barley and 
canola against yield shortfall caused by natural perils including flood, frost, 
drought and vermin offered to 100 Landmark customers in WA, SA, Vic 
and NSW. 
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ProCrop Agent of CGU (via Insurance House Pty Ltd) offering rainfall index, loss of 
revenue product to WA, SA and Victorian grain farmers only. 
Elders Agent of QBE offering defined perils cover for broadacre crops. 
CelsiusPro Climate consultant/agency that works with SwissRe to analyse data and 
structure indexed weather solutions for all industries through its 
association with WRMA. Offers index-based solutions in derivative form. 
What is crop insurance for? 
It is recognised that all crop producers confront season-to-season production and 
revenue volatility.  Numerous factors are responsible for this variability but it is 
recognised that most of these are beyond the scope of management or control by the 
farmer.   Crop insurance is best thought of as a means by which such exogenous risks 
can be transferred from the farm account: the overall yield of the farm business is 
thereby reduced by the amount of the premium paid but the downside unpredictability is 
taken care of.  Crop insurance is usually a discretionary purchase as the farmer can 
choose whether or not to take it out and assume the cost of the premium within the farm 
budget.  On occasions, it may be a requirement of a farm seasonal loan.  As farm lending 
rises, so too does the potential for loan default and bankruptcy.   
Crop insurance has an important role to play in a production environment confronting 
climate change and global warming.  Few involved in the farming sector with first-hand 
experience of the impact of weather on their business would disagree that, even if trends 
are scarcely noticeable, weather extremes and seasonal uncertainty has become more 
frequent. 
The charts below show the visible trend for temperatures recorded at Mackay, QLD 
(WMO: 94367) for the 59 year period on record from 1959 to 2017. Both charts, showing 
December temperatures (the average and the maximum for the month) show a marked 
increase of approximately 1.25°C and 2.5°C, respectively, across the period.  These data 
were selected from a single site and a single month at random but, nonetheless, are 
representative of the pattern shown by the data more broadly. 
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So how do insurers play a role in assisting the farming sector deal with climate change?  
Clearly insurers cannot ignore the trend in these data and the calculation of a 
temperature-related contract would certainly take this into account.  But it is the 
increased uncertainty about next year’s temperature (or other weather element) which 
insurers can help to manage. 
How much is crop insurance worth? 
It is hard to determine what insurance is ‘worth’.  It is fair so say that most people who 
purchase insurance against their house being destroyed are prepared to do so because 
the cost of its replacement, were it to do so, would be beyond their means.  The cost of 
the premium is not comparable against any other similar purchase so the only reference 
point as to its reasonableness is by comparison between insurance providers. 
Yet for agricultural insurance there are few, sometimes if any, comparisons available to 
make such an evaluation.  At the same time, agricultural production systems are rather 
high risk: the chances of something going wrong in a growing season are well 
recognised.  And so – even when premium levels are calculated entirely fairly – the levels 
appear expensive.  To make matters worse, when compared to other types of insurance 
that a farmer might buy, the premium (and the risk) make for a very poor comparison.  
So, on the face of it, it is all too easy to dismiss crop (especially multi-peril) insurance as 
simply being too expensive. 
Insurers are rational traders, they are motivated to return a profit for their capital 
providers.  However such rationality also extends to pricing the risk they assume at a 
reasonable level.  Generally speaking this a matter for resolution by a competitive 
market place: price the risk too high and clients take their business elsewhere.  Price a 
risk too cheaply, and claims will soon exceed premiums.  There is no evidence to suggest 
that providers of crop insurance in the Australian market have over-priced the risk they 
offer to cover.  So if the price does not match demand, something needs to be done. 
Examples of Similar Work Undertaken Previously 
There are numerous examples, too many to elaborate comprehensively in this report, of 
crop insurance schemes worldwide that enjoy levels of voluntary adoption by farmers 
such as to provide strong evidence that crop insurance can be feasible. 
Looking at the largest and longest established schemes, those found in the USA, Canada, 
Mexico, India, China, Turkey and certain countries of the EU (notably Spain, France and 
Italy) all have a premium subsidy to a lesser or greater extent.  These are all ‘national’ 
programmes – although some administered at state or provincial level – and are 
distributed by commercial insurance companies. 
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In each of these countries, the existence of a subsidised crop insurance offer tends to 
crowd out the existence of non-subsidised crop insurance.  This is not surprising as it is 
obviously not possible to compete on premium price levels without a subsidy.  However, 
and this is not definitive, it appears that the very existence of a subsidised programme 
seems to have some impact in deterring the development of other, innovative crop 
insurances. 
It is very often the case that national crop insurance programmes – even the very 
diverse Federal programme in the USA – do not cater for all crop types and all farmers.  
In such cases, although the insurers involved do develop their own ‘private’ policies to 
address specific needs, it is seldom the case that insurers not otherwise engaged in the 
sector see themselves as sufficiently experienced or resourced to move into the sector.  
At the large corporate level, where a product tailored to the needs of the individual 
farmer may not either be available or suitable, the commercial insurance and especially 
reinsurance market can respond with tailor-made programmes.  By way of example of 
some of these, the following transactions have been successfully without any form of 
premium or cost subsidy:  
1. Grain Crop Volume – Australia  
Risk: Grain crop volumes in Western Australia – all sources 
of variance 
Index: Actual volume of grain delivered 
Structure: State-wide grain receivals index, plus second trigger 
adjustment based on Australian Bureau of Statistics 
data  
 
Risk protection buyer (the insured’s) revenues are dependent on WA grain crop 
volumes each year.  A captive (buyer-owned insurer) was utilised to provide protection 
to divisions of the business against downturns in crop volumes and WTW arranged a 
reinsurance protection for the captive to transfer this group exposure to the 
reinsurance market.    
2. AFRICAN RISK CAPACITY – Africa  
Risk: Drought, as determined at the level of an individual 
country 
Index: Rainfall parameterised to reflect each country’s staple 
crop’s specific rainfall requirements  
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Structure: Index-based aggregate excess of loss reinsurance 
 
Africa Risk Capacity Insurance Company Ltd (ARC Ltd) is a Bermuda based mutual 
insurance company, set up to issue insurance policies against drought to any member 
country in Africa. It allows member countries to respond quickly to a developing crisis, 
and rely less on uncertain international aid in times of drought. Initially five African 
countries participated in the unique programme: Kenya, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Niger and Senegal. Since then further countries have joined the programme pool. WTW 
has placed wholly commercial reinsurance coverage for this programme for each of its 
4 years of operation. The transaction has won numerous industry awards for its 
innovation.    
3. NFU Sugar – UK  
Risk: Extreme and prolonged freeze at the time of harvest 
Index: Temperature   
Structure: Weather index plus second trigger adjustment based 
on actual farm yield 
 
The NFU (National Farmers’ Union) Sugar transaction includes primarily a weather 
trigger but also benefits from actual farm delivery data to ensure accuracy of payment.  
All UK sugar beet farmers (who are represented by NFU Sugar) are covered by this 
industry-wide scheme.  
4. Commercial Farming Group – South Africa 
Risk: Farm unit grain yield  
Type: Material damage to insured crops, protecting 
financiers’ interests 
Structure: Traditional multi-peril crop insurance covering reduced 
yield as a consequence of natural perils. 
 
Providing protection for a large farming group in South Africa and their financiers, 
covering a portfolio of growers and their combined 40,000 ha of assorted grain crops.   
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5. Commercial fruit grower – New Zealand 
Risk: Revenue reduction resulting from loss of export quality 
fruit 
Index: Actual crop pack-out 
Structure: Indemnity of loss in value 
 
Uniquely for an index-based cover, this programme is triggered by a dual trigger 
reflecting not just the overall volume of fruit packed by the insured but also, critically, 
the quality of that fruit. As one of New Zealand’s largest fruit exporters, only fruit of 
export quality is sufficient for the company to achieve its revenue targets. The tailor-
made coverage replaced a traditional hail-only insurance policy which had failed to 
achieve the client’s risk management objectives.   
6. Vineyards - France 
Risk: Freeze at time of bud/flowering 
Index: Temperature (TMin) 
Structure: Payments are made on the basis of daily minimum 
temperatures recorded at a nearby national 
meteorological recording station.  As TMin during the 
reference period (targeted at the critical few weeks for 
the vines) reaches successively lower temperatures 
incrementally greater amounts of the policy limits are 
payable up to the maximum agreed amount. 
The grower in question, a highly renowned producer and global brand of premium 
quality wine, chose to take out this form of index-based insurance as opposed to a 
more conventional form of crop insurance due to its simplicity of operation, certainty of 
performance and speed of payment.  As with all such index-based contracts the buyer 
was able to choose the policy parameters (dates, temperature thresholds, payment 
increments and policy limit) to best suit its economic needs and risk management 
requirements. 
Protection for Growers  
The individual farmer research carried out by the project team (by means of 
questionnaires and on-farm interviews) has established that there is generally a very low 
take-up of the ‘conventional’ crop insurance available to farmers at present.  These 
insurances include: 
 Single/’named’ peril crop insurance: typically hail, frost or fire cover (higher 
take-up rate for cotton and sugarcane insurance) 
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 Multi-peril crop insurance: typically whole farm yield loss protection 
(equivalent to ‘all risks’) where exclusions are specified in the policy such as 
failure to carry out good farming practice 
 Area yield coverage: though, to the best of our knowledge, it is not the case 
that this is available for either cotton or sugarcane growers in Australia; and, 
finally Weather index-based protection. 
 Weather index-based crop insurance: as further described in this report and 
available from at least one provider in Australia. 
Although an awareness of the potential use of crop insurance as a means of risk 
management was found to be widespread, its take-up was very low.  The reason for its 
low take-up was generally cited as being due to its perceived high cost; and the relatively 
better value of other risk management strategies (whether or not they strictly deliver an 
equivalent level of protection).  Typically these may be better described as risk avoidance 
strategies, such as alternative or no planting options. 
That said, for both cotton and sugar cane, there is important demand for cotton hail 
protection and sugarcane fire coverage both of which appear to be largely well catered 
for by existing insurance products. These would appear to be perfectly adequate wheels 
that do not need reinvention. 
It is also questionable how much awareness there may be of the different types of crop 
insurance that are commercially available. 
However, again from the project’s investigations, it is not clear that the insurance 
industry has gone far enough to explore what farmers might wish to buy if it were 
available.  It is clearly not reason enough to maintain that premiums per se are just too 
expensive.  If we make the assumption that the market for crop insurance is free and 
competitive, it follows that the market price for premiums would be ‘fair’ or, in other 
words, properly reflective of the underlying risk.  And it is not refuted here that the 
underlying risk of crop insurance is potentially high; so it follows that the fair premium 
would logically reflect this and the loss history of the sector. 
Nonetheless high premium cost is prohibitive and accounts for the very low take-up of 
crop insurance by Queensland farmers and, indeed, by farmers all over Australia and in 
other countries. 
In certain countries, notably in the United States of America, Canada, India, China and 
parts of the EU, this premium cost barrier is lowered by government intervention by 
means of subsidies.  These subsidies usually explicitly contribute a share to the cost of 
the premium (NB the underlying premium is still priced at fair value) such that the 
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farmer only pays a prescribed fraction of the true premium.  In addition the subsidy may 
contribute to the overall cost of the policy/programme administration and operation 
(including insurer overhead, margin and handling, such as loss adjustment).  These costs 
would otherwise necessarily be included in the premium charged and borne by the 
farmer. 
It may also be the case that the Government may choose to waive additional expense 
such as premium tax (Stamp Duty) or other ad valorem overheads that it might 
otherwise charge.  This can amount to a valuable concession as such charges fall in the 
range of 2.5 up to 30%. 
It is noted that the Victorian government have removed Stamp Duty amounting to a 10% 
saving in the premium cost, but there is no such exception for crop insurance policies 
purchased in Queensland. In its recent budget the government of New South Wales took 
also the decision to abolish Stamp Duty on crop and livestock insurance policies. 
The authors recognise that any contribution to the reduction of cost of crop insurance 
would likely stimulate the demand for and take-up of crop insurance in Australia as has 
been the case elsewhere.  In the absence of any such price support, we conclude that 
there is a need for the insurance industry to respond with self-supporting low cost 
protections. 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is also influential on the extent to which the state 
may provide support to agricultural insurance.  Whilst the overall concept of support 
remains compliant with its so-called ‘Green Box’ status, the extent and structural design 
of the insurance must adhere to to certain prescribed limits. 
Weather Index-Based Insurance 
Although, as set out above, weather indexed-based products have been available to 
farmers in Australia for a number of years but, as yet, have failed to achieve scale, it is 
the conclusion of this report that such products are best likely to meet farmers’ needs for 
affordable and effective insurance to cover their key risks.  
Weather risk management contracts have evolved over the past 25 years to protect 
weather sensitive industries against precipitation, temperature and other index-based 
weather perils.  These contracts generally reference an independent arbiter of actual 
weather conditions, such as the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) in Australia.   
Key contract variables such as attachment points, pay-outs and limits are structured to 
compensate the buyer for a pre-defined weather outcome, as opposed to actual loss (or 
strict indemnity).  For this reason, the analysis and structuring components of the cover 
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are critical in order to eliminate, or at least minimise, basis risk – i.e. the risk that actual 
losses are not well represented by the index.  Correlating weather outcomes to increased 
costs, or reduced revenue, is an actuarially driven process using either actual or 
modelled financial and historical weather data. 
As outlined in earlier sections of this report, the project has entailed an in-depth 
understanding of the potential cost to farmers in the event of insufficient or excessive 
rainfall or extreme temperatures resulting in loss of yields.  The information provided by 
individual farmers and industry bodies can be used to structure and execute any number 
of weather risk transfer contracts, although initially we address: 
Cotton 
 Drought Cover: insufficient rainfall during the planting season – August to 
November; 
 Drought Cover: insufficient rainfall during growing season – November to 
February;  
 Wet Harvest Cover: excessive rainfall during harvest season – March to June 
Sugarcane (perennial crop) 
 Cyclone Cover: crop damage during cyclone season – November to April 
 Wet Harvest Cover: excessive rainfall during harvest season – June to December 
We provide further details on the pages that follow.  As already mentioned, the concepts 
outlined are equally applicable to a large number of adverse weather scenarios.  It is the 
intention of this document to outline our understanding of a small sub-set of these 
exposures, demonstrate how these risks may be transferred and propose that we 
undertake a pilot programme prior to developing a range of other weather products for 
the benefit of sugarcane, cotton and potentially other farmers (as part of DCAP Phase 2). 
Rather than competing with any existing insurance arrangements in place through other 
agricultural insurers, the concepts presented in this paper contemplate a totally distinct 
risk transfer service that the sugarcane and cotton industries could provide to farmers. 
In the authors’ opinion, the agriculture sector is uniquely positioned to deliver real 
innovation to farmers which could greatly reduce reliance on somewhat subjective Farm 
Household Allowance (FHA) payments and Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery 
Arrangements sometimes available from Government. 
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Basis risk 
Weather index-based covers are a proxy for on-farm crop performance and yield levels 
generally.  It is recognised that, unlike traditional indemnity-based covers, the index is 
not a perfect replica of actual yield and therefore there is likely to a mismatch between 
the two, referred to as ‘basis risk’.  This risk may result in an under or over payment by 
the contract when compared to the actual farm experience.  It is the objective to 
minimise basis by optimal index design and by sourcing data from a measurement 
station that most closely match the farm weather. 
However it is worth considering that the potential for this basis risk varies considerably 
according to (a) the nature of the weather element involved – rain, temperature etc. (b) 
the period of time over which the measurements critical to the index performance are 
taken and (c) the extent to which the index measurements will be triggered near to the 
average or a point whose occurrence is more infrequent.  Taking each in turn: 
The nature of the weather element: as is well known, on a daily basis, rain may fall 
heavily in one area whereas a location just a short distance away may receive no rain at 
all.  Conversely, with the exception of micro-climatic influences such as frost hollows or 
extreme altitude, temperature tends to be more diffusely experienced over wider areas. 
The period of time: the longer the period of time taken in a measurement series, the 
more representative it is likely to be of the location.  A spot, say one day, recording 
includes all the randomness of that day.  Whereas if drought is the matter of concern, 
then daily measurements taken over a period weeks or months will better reflect the 
actual weather impacting the crop.  Longer periods of time measurement will similarly 
tend to reduce the geo-spatial randomness associated with a certain element, such as 
rainfall, as mentioned above. 
The trigger point: as is well known, crop yield and production is influenced by numerous 
production factors.  Selecting only weather factors, small variations around the mean are 
unlikely to influence the yield outcome greatly.  Rather, it will tend to be other 
agricultural influences such fertility, pest load or plant genetics which determine yield 
variability.  However, extreme weather events tend to become the predominant 
determinant of extreme low yield outcomes.  So, an absence of rainfall at a critical period 
of plant growth, say at the time of planting/germination, is likely to impact the crop very 
markedly.   
For this reason, weather index-based solutions in agricultural production are better 
structured where the defining parameter(s) are set far from the mean at a point at which 
the correlation of extreme event and crop impact tends to be high.  This has the 
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coincident benefit of reducing premium cost by reducing the expected frequency of 
triggering of the contract. 
Compulsory vs Voluntary agricultural insurance 
It is not specifically the objective of this report to contemplate any form of compulsion 
for farmers to become involved in any crop insurance as this would clearly be 
unacceptable in a free market.  However, it merits pointing out that the desirable feature 
of choice introduces the concept of ‘selection’ or the rather less desirable ‘anti-selection’.  
This is the potential for an unintended negative feedback loop whereby insurance is only 
taken out by those who perceive (or indeed know) that they need it most.  The resulting 
poor claims results forces an upward movement on premium pricing which, in turn, 
confines affordability to a yet smaller and more exposed subset of potential buyers. 
For reasons of lack of data or poor granularity of that data it is not always possible for 
insurers to reflect accurately the differing levels of risk presented by locality, let alone at 
individual farm level.  So, inevitably the perception of risk is generalised which may or 
may not reflect accurately an individual farmer’s perception of the risk he/she faces.  
Such perception will typically be informed by years of actual farming experience at the 
location itself.  So it is by this information asymmetry that the effect of anti-selection can 
arise; and generally the toxic spiral that follows. 
Conversely, where all farmers are automatically enrolled into a scheme, it follows that 
premium pricing distortions resulting from anti-selection do not occur.  In turn this tends 
to result in the premium costing that matches more closely the true underlying risk; 
meaning that the insurance can be a more efficiently priced risk management 
instrument.   
In farming systems where the risk is somewhat binary (it either is or is not an 
appreciable concern from farm to farm) it may be harder to mutualise risk in this way, as 
those farmers who do not consider themselves to be at risk, much or at all, will tend to 
object to their subsidisation of those other unfortunate farmers who are at risk. This 
situation is further exacerbated by circumstances in which a farmer may choose to 
implement other risk management strategies which obviate the need for insurance. 
Where a risk – such as drought and cyclone – is largely systemic throughout a farming 
community, then aside from the challenge of ascribing fair premium rates that are 
properly commensurate with the risk that each farm presents, then the concept of 
mutualisation is likely to make more sense. 
To conclude on this point – and to repeat – we do not advocate any form of compulsory 
insurance scheme as being a realistic proposition.  It merely merits pointing out that 
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certain all-too-important premium pricing efficiencies may be achieved from an ‘all-in’ 
scheme, which are not available on a self-select basis.  We would recommend further 
exploration of this topic so as to rule in or rule out any possibility of wide scale 
mutualisation. 
Non-insurance risk management strategies 
This purpose of this report is to explore insurance based, or equivalent, financial contract 
based solutions.  However, the desirability or otherwise of these solutions must be 
considered in the context of the status quo and, in particular, alternative strategies for 
managing risk at farm level as collectively form the current, do-nothing new option. 
First, although this may not universally be true, it is assumed that a rational farmer 
would always prefer to adopt the least cost risk management strategies that are available 
as the first risk management strategy.  This makes perfect sense as typically these 
include farming best practice and may even be the no cost option. 
However where there is exogenous risk, beyond the control good farming practice, there 
remains residual risk which is characteristically severe and unpredictable.  Even for these 
risks there are strategies.  For example, the formalised and tax-efficient Farm 
Management Deposits Scheme (FMD) managed by the Federal Government. The FMD 
scheme aims to smooth out cash flow fluctuations and increase the self-reliance of farms, 
with the profits from a good year able to be spread across bad years. The pre-income 
profit that is deposited into a FMD is tax deductible, and only becomes taxable in the 
financial year when withdrawn. 
Three recent changes recognised the realities of modern farming: from July 1, 2016, the 
FMD cap doubled from $400,000 to $800,000; the early access trigger during times of 
drought was re-established; and the law preventing FMDs being used as offset accounts 
against primary production business debt was removed. 
FMDs can provide an opportunity for self-insurance, if used correctly and drawn down 
when the farm is in hardship. But, there is limitation to the FMD scheme, with FMDs only 
issued in an individual farmer’s name, not in a farm company, partnership or trust 
account, and must be held in the account for more than 12 months (unless drought 
trigger is activated). The self-discipline of farmers also play an important role in the 
effectiveness of FMDs, with farmers needing to commit to deposit profits in good years, 
and draw down funds in bad years.  
Federally, there is also the Farm Household Allowance (FHA).  This provides farmers and 
their families experiencing financial hardship with financial support. This payment is 
managed through the Department of Human Services and is tailored to farmers. 
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For natural disasters, assistance is available through a joint funding model between the 
federal and state governments.  The Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements 
(NDRRA) provide disaster relief and recovery payments and infrastructure restoration to 
help communities recover from the effects of natural disasters. Most relief measures 
under NDRRA are funded 75% by the Commonwealth Government and 25% by the 
Queensland Government. The level of assistance available depends on the category of 
assistance triggered by the natural disaster, with farmers receiving direct assistance in 
categories C & D. 
The Queensland Government Drought Relief Assistance Scheme (DRAS) is another level 
of assistance available to farmers, primarily around animal welfare. DRAS’s purpose is to 
help drought declared properties manage the welfare of their breeding herd, and assist in 
restoring herds after drought. For this, DRAS provides three main assistance measures: 
freight subsidies for transporting water; freight subsidies for transporting fodder; the 
Emergency Water Infrastructure Rebate (EWIR) for the purchase and installation of water 
infrastructure for animal welfare needs.  
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A Worked Example: Cotton 
In this example we examine the case of cotton grown in the Dalby area in the Darling 
Downs region of Queensland.  Cotton is extensively grown around Dalby and two gins are 
located within a short distance of the town. 
We obtained a historic yield series from USQ for the 24 year period from 1992 to 2015.  
The series is largely complete, with only two missing years (1994 and 2000) which are 
therefore ignored for the purposes of this illustration.  We have also obtained the daily 
rainfall data series for Dalby from the Bureau of Meteorology. 
Analysis of these data shows a strong correlation between the yield of cotton in a given 
season and the total rainfall recorded during January and February of that season.  
Figure 7-1 below enables a visual comparison between high/low and high/low yields.  
 
Figure 7-1 Cotton yield versus rainfall (Dalby) 
In particular, it is clear that years in which the yield of cotton was markedly less than the 
long term average of 1,180 kg/ha were characterised by low Jan/Feb rainfall.  These 
years were 1993, 1997, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2014: 6 years out of 24 (25%).  Also, 
importantly, there were no years of low yields in which rainfall was not also low. 
An average frequency of occurrence for poor crop yield of 1 year in 4 is rather high but is 
reflective of the natural variability of growing conditions in this region.  A conclusion of 
this analysis and these observations however is that low yield can be attributed to low 
rainfall, regardless of other production factors and external influences. 
On this basis it would be feasible to design an index-based insurance product that is 
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at Dalby Airport.  Figure 7.2 below shows the rainfall and a ‘strike’ level below which an 
index-based policy might payout.  In this instance, for illustrative purposes, the strike 
level has been set at 50% of the long-term average rainfall for January and February 
which equates to approximately 80mm. 
 
Figure 7-2 An illustration of rainfall and the selection of a trigger point 
At this level of strike, it can be seen that the contract would have made payments in 
each of the low yield years with the exception of 2009. 
In practice, it is likely that a policy that pays one year in four is likely to be more costly 
than is commercially attractive.  So in the design of the index policy an attachment point 
needs to be found that balances the risk management objectives of the buyer with its 
premium price point.  Table 7-1 below show how, for this rainfall series at Dalby Airport, 
a changing strike point alters the how the policy would have paid in the 24 years in 
question. 










Strike (mm): 40 50 60 70 80
1993 -              -             -              0.4            10.4          
1997 -              -             0.6              10.6          20.6          
2005 16.4            26.4           36.4            46.4          56.4          
2007 -              1.0              11.0            21.0          31.0          
2010 -              -             -              -            4.4            
2014 -              2.6              12.6            22.6          32.6          
No years 1                 3                 4                  5               6               
Probability 4% 13% 17% 21% 25%
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For example, setting the strike point of the policy at 40mm from 80mm reduces the 
frequency of payment to a single year during the period.  Arguably 1 year in 24 is not 
sufficiently frequent to provide protection in a range of years with poor yield, so a higher 
strike point might be preferable.  We shall choose a strike point of 50mm for this 
illustration. 
There are two further contract assumptions which are integral to the function of all 
index-based contacts.  First is the basis on which the contract pays after the trigger point 
has been reached: the so-called ‘tick’ value is the amount paid for every millimetre 
recorded that is less than the strike point.  In this case we have chosen a tick value of 
$120 per millimetre.  Secondly, there is a contract limit which is the maximum payable 
under the contract regardless of the rainfall, here $3,000 per hectare.  For the purposes 
of this example we make the assumption that all values apply ‘per hectare’ which is a 
simple and practical basis of operation and in line with traditional insurance procedure. 
Figure 7-3 below shows how the selected trigger, tick and limit values determine the 
payment outcomes of the contract according to the level of rainfall recorded. 
 
Figure 7-3 The relationship between rainfall and contract payments 
On this basis Table 7-2, below, shows the payments that would have been received in 
each of the three years for which a payment would have been triggered. 
Table 7-2 Illustration of an index-based contract payout 
 
Strike (mm) Tick ($/mm) Limit ($/ha)
50 120 3,000          
2005 26.4            3,168         3,000          
2007 1.0              120            120             
2014 2.6              312            312             
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In this case, as there would have been no payments made in any of the other years since 
1992, the average payment for the entire time series would have been $143 per hectare 
(being $3,432 ÷24).  It is this average payment which forms the basis of calculating the 
premium.  In practice this simplifies the process that an insurer might typically use to 
model the expected loss under the contract.  In addition, of course, the final premium 
charged would include a commercial margin to cover expenses, profit etc. 
A Worked Example: Sugarcane 
As a contrast to the previous worked example for cotton low yield resulting from a 
shortage of rain, a situation which develops over a moderate period of time, weeks and 
months, we consider below a distinctly different cause of crop loss, namely damage to 
and loss of yield of sugar cane resulting from cyclones. 
It is well recognised that tropical cyclones occur with some regularity in the Northern 
Territory, eastern and western states of Australia and their destructive impact on the 
sugar cane industry in Queensland can be very severe.  Canegrowers who participated in 
the survey upon which this report is based responded that while valuable fire insurance 
was available they were not availed of any suitable coverage for cyclone related damage. 
The effect of cyclone on sugarcane is largely twofold: (i) mechanical, whereby the stems 
are snapped and torn by the strength of the wind leaving the plant compromised and (ii) 
water logging as a result of the extreme rainfall associated the cyclone. 
Figure 7.4, below, shows sugar cane yields in the shire of Burdekin recorded since 1970.  
It shows that 2 out of the 4 years with yields below the long term coincide with cyclone 
activity in the area.  However low rainfall is also associated with yield short fall. 
 
Figure 7-4 Sugarcane yields in Burdekin  
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However it seems that extreme rainfall on its own does not reflect years of low yield in 
the historical yield records.  Table 3 shows the maximum daily and aggregate 3-day 
rainfall recorded at Mackay.  There are some events of unprecedented magnitude 
reflected in this dataset and a comparison with more localised yield history than was 
available from this project’s survey would be expected to reflect damage and yield loss 
associated with rainfall of this magnitude. 
Table 7-3 Extreme rainfall events at Mackay 
 
Conversely, we note some correlation associated with low rainfall seasons which are 
shown both in Figure 7.4, above and Figure 7.5, below which compares grower records of 
sugarcane yield at Mount Kanigan with the accumulated rainfall in September, October 
and November. 
 
Figure 7-5 Sugarcane yield vs rainfall at Mount Kanigan 
We note that there is not only a wide range of periodic rainfall such as that shown in 











388.6    796.1    9.3 01 March 1963
356.0    543.6    11.3 15 February 2008
326.0    414.0    3.1 17 November 2000
314.0    781.6    5.8 29 December 1990
302.8    467.6    11.3 06 February 1979
286.0    357.6    9.1 05 January 1996
255.8    513.2    9.1 03 January 1991
249.6    438.4    11.3 02 February 2007
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7.6 below shows the monthly profile of rainfall recorded at Mackay and that the 
maximum rainfall may be ten or more times the monthly average. 
 
 
Figure 7-6 Profile of monthly rainfall at Mackay (1960-2016) 
This report notes the potential suitability of a different design of index-based insurance 
product known as a “cat-in-a-box”.  This form of protection is suitable for event related 
loss such as that arising from the occurrence of a cyclone.  The index definitions include: 
(a) a defined area, (b) the definition of the event occurring within that area and (c) the 
payment criteria associated with (a) and (b). Although this style of protection refers to a 
“box”, the shape of the area may equally be a circle, rectangle or other defined polygon. 
The definition of the event normally refers to the magnitude of the insured element, in 
this case the magnitude of the cyclone which may be defined by reference to one or 
more physical measurements or, perhaps, more simply being a ‘named’ cyclone.  By 
definition, these have reached a set threshold of magnitude in terms of wind speed and 
therefore damage potential. 
The payment under the contract is usually defined as being a function of either (a) binary 
i.e. any event within the ‘box’ or (b) a time-dependent payment whereby the longer the 
period of time event remains within the ‘box’ the greater the payment. 
Under certain circumstances, the ‘box’ may have a series of boundaries, for example 
concentric circles for which events occurring in the inner circle(s) – closer to the assets at 
risk – receive a higher level of payment than events occurring in the outer circle(s).  This 
design style is appropriate for elements such as windstorm and earthquake where the 
damage impact attenuates with distance. 
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So, with cyclone activity, events passing some distance from the sugarcane growing area 
may bring high wind and rainfall but neither sufficiently in excess to cause damage.  
Indeed, plentiful rainfall may have a beneficial impact on subsequent yield. 
It is the observation of this report that the sugarcane industry in Queensland would 
benefit from the availability of cyclone coverage.  For reasons set out elsewhere in this 
report – and as borne out by the lack of coverage currently available to growers – we 
believe that an innovative approach to the design of this coverage is needed to deliver an 
appropriate product that is as affordable as the variable climatic conditions allow.  An 
index-based ‘cat-in-a-box’ style of coverage offers the potential to extend the present 
fire coverage to include an element of cyclone protection without the need for a costly 
insurance infrastructure.  Such an index-based product may also be supplemented with 
either extreme low or high rainfall protection. 
Index-based vs traditional or MPCI insurance 
The conventional indemnity-based insurance policy offerings have certain apparent 
benefits, especially insofar as they are usually contracted on an individual farm basis with 
actual losses (or physical damage) being measured at the farm itself.  Conversely, index-
based contracts infer the relationship between actual on-farm performance and that of 
the index; with the attendant concern that there may be differences between the two. 
However, aside from their simplicity of operation, index-based policies offer certain 
distinct advantages which – under circumstances where traditional insurance either does 
not exist or is not economically feasible – enable the implementation of valuable risk 
management where it would otherwise not be possible. 
The challenge faced by insurers in issuing multi-peril crop insurance stems from the 
costly and complicated requirement to obtain farm-level risk information and provide loss 
adjustment services.  Index-based policies require neither of these which immediately 
removes an element of cost from the process, enabling index-based programmes to be 
costed with lower overhead. 
Importantly the vicious circle of anti-selection (as discussed in the context of compulsory 
vs voluntary schemes) does not apply.  At farm-level, a concern that traditional crop 
insurances face is the selection of only parts of the farm that are more exposed than 
others.  Whilst it is generally a requirement that the insured farmer should insure all of 
the eligible cropping, this may not always be the case. 
Insurers offering an index-based programme need not have such concern as it the index 
location rather than the specifics of the farm location that determine the contract 
outcome.  It follows that buyers can be offered flexibility as to how they purchase their 
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policy.  For example, if a farmer would prefer to take out index-based coverage for only a 
selected proportion of his farm, then this should be possible at no penalty or 
disadvantage.  The index policy may simply be set up by reference to a certain number 
of hectares – which may, or may not, amount to all the hectares farmed. 
In the case of farms which are extremely extensive or divided across many locations, it is 
likely that each distinct location would require its own appropriate geographical 
reference. 
MPCI insurers also concern themselves with the quality of the farming that they insure; 
poor farming practices inevitable increase the chances of lower farm yields.  It is very 
hard to make a judgement about the quality of farming practice without costly 
interventions such as farm surveys; this too adds to the cost burden of offering such a 
policy.  Again, index-based policies perform without reference to the quality of the 
underlying farm, farmer or other human influence.  As such, this component of risk does 
not need to be costed into the premium of an index-based policy. 
Conventional, indemnity-based policies very typically (and logically) include conditionality 
to protect the insurer against adverse performance.  These include ‘warranties’ (in which 
certain aspects of, say, risk management are deemed to be in place and remain so 
during the course of the policy) or ‘exclusions’ (in which losses or damage arising from 
specifically itemised risks are deemed not to be covered).  There may also be time-
related criteria which determine that only losses occurring during (or out of) a given time 
period are payable.  All such conditionality must be properly stated in the policy contract 
and there are legal provisions to ensure that these are represented properly and fairly.  
However the consequence of such conditionality is that not all claims and losses become 
payable; sometimes this may be unexpected and disappointing.  In any event, it 
represents a disparity between actual loss and the amount of the claim payable.  So it is 
not only index-based policies that may introduce an element of such mismatch. 
After the occurrence of a loss or damage, time is very often ‘of the essence’; certainly 
speed of claims settlement is a key performance criterion by which an insurer may be 
judged. A simple, straightforward claim should be handled quickly and with little or no 
intervention by a competent insurer.  However agricultural risk is seldom simple or 
straightforward; both yield-based insurances and named peril policies usually need on-
farm intervention including one or more visits by a qualified loss adjuster. 
Insured farms are generally dispersed quite extensively in rural areas and expert loss 
adjusters are thin on the ground, so the ability of an insurer to service a widespread loss 
event can be challenging and time-consuming.  As crops (and indeed livestock) are 
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distinctly perishable, especially following damage or death, it is sometimes the case that 
the claims ‘evidence’ has long since disappeared. Technological solutions including 
straightforward photographic evidence – but now including drone technology – have 
much to contribute to improve this situation. 
Under circumstances where there are systemic losses – in which all or most farmers in a 
given area are similarly afflicted – it may actually be impossible to adjust all losses 
individually.  In which case, an insurer may seek to agree a settlement value without 
adjusting each loss individually.  Even with this relatively simplicity and such a pragmatic 
approach, the time taken to reach a settlement that is fair to all concerned, as it must 
be, is likely to be protracted. 
A major performance advantage of index-based insurances is their speed of settlement.  
As the policy only references the index whose data components will have been very 
specifically detailed in the contract, the only obligation at the expiry of the contract is to 
obtain the index data and apply the prescribed calculation formula to establish whether a 
payment is due and, if so, how much. 
In a wide range of index-based contracts (such as apply, for example, in the power and 
energy sector) and where index data (daily temperature) are readily and reliably 
available, the contact may provide for settlement with 15 days.  This is clearly very 
efficient by any standards. 
There is no fundamental reason why index-based policies issued to farmers should not 
perform in the same way.  It may be the case, however, that the agency (as nominated 
in the policy) responsible for compiling the ‘settlement data’ can only obtain (or release) 
the data after a prescribed period, say after month end. However this fact would be 
known in advance and factored into the payment procedure set out in the policy. 
All index-based policies need to make provision for the inadvertent failure of the primary 
data provider, usually a nominated weather station.  If that station fails or, for some 
reason, is unable to report the data as required, then secondary or back-up procedures 
are needed. It may be the case that an alternative station is sufficiently proximate or it 
may be necessary to make use of alternative sources or methodologies.  In any event it 
is essential that recovery procedures are set out in the contract.  Needless to say, the 
need to activate back-up procedures may add an element of delay to the process but as 
this is already quick, it is unlikely to become problematic. 
Timing of contract inception 
Crop insurances are usually bound well ahead of the crop planting period.  In any case 
this needs to fit in with the farm planning calendar but also so that coverage can be in 
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place during the critical early stages of plant growth.  It may the case that certain crop 
insurance contracts have final application cut-off dates that are months prior to sowing.  
A farmer who fails to make an application in time will find himself without the protection 
he/she needs. 
Index-based coverages are more flexible in this regard although it is the case that index-
based insurers seek to ensure that the contract is executed well ahead of the period in 
which a reputable forecast might be able to predict the contract outcome, or at least an 
increased likelihood of trigger. 
This added flexibility may allow the farmer to delay the decision to take out an index-
based policy under circumstances which would deny him an opportunity to buy traditional 
crop insurance. 
Index-based insurances are not necessarily concerned with pre-existing conditions, such 
as soil moisture which may be a factor that determines a farmer’s last minute decision to 
plant, or not plant. 
The Use of the Earth Observation Data and Vegetation Indices 
This report has referenced indices that are generally based on a single weather element 
measured at a physical location close to the farming area.  However there are sets of 
indices, specifically designed to measure plant health and crop growth that are derived 
from satellite, remote observation data and visual imagery rather than conventional 
meteorological data recordings. 
It is not the purpose of this report to document these in detail but they merit reference 
and possible consideration in any future programme design.  Foremost amongst these, at 
least in as far as practical application in index based programmes is concerned, are those 
based upon the Normalised Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI).  This index is essentially 
a relative score of the ‘greenness’ or density of green on a defined area of land; the 
measurement is made by detectors that can record the wavelengths of visible and near 
infra-red light reflected by plants.  Chlorophyll absorbs light within a characteristic band 
of wavelengths (0.4 – 0.7 µm) whereas the cell structure reflect near-infrared light (0.7 - 
1.1 µm).  Measurement in these bands and a formulaic calculation between their 
difference provides an index (between minus one and plus one) that is strongly indicative 
of the drought status of plants in the pixel.  An improvement on NDVI is the Enhanced 
Vegetation Index (EVI) which is similar to NDVI but is based upon improved satellite 
technology that reports at a much higher spatial resolution (250m) and a greater number 
of wavelengths. 
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NDVI and EVI have been successfully deployed in index-based programmes where the 
density of green (as opposed to, say, crop yield) is of importance: notably in the 
coverage of pasture and grassland used to support grazing cattle. 
Other Considerations 
Group Buying Power 
Queensland Farmers Federation members, Canegrowers and Cotton Australia, are in a 
position to use their size and scale of their membership base as a way of providing more 
cost-effective cover to growers.  Mechanisms, such as a captive insurer or discretionary 
mutual fund (DMF), can be used to pool risk common to growers.  Such arrangements 
can facilitate efficient risk sharing among growers by aggregating low value, high 
frequency losses and funding these from a dedicated pool of shared capital, meaning that 
external insurer capital would only be used – and paid for – to protect against an 
accumulation of smaller losses or one-off large losses in excess of Canegrowers’ or 
Cotton Australia’s risk appetite.    
Captive Insurer 
The establishment of a captive insurance company is one way for organisations to 
exercise an enhanced degree of control over the provision of risk transfer products.  
Additional benefits that could accrue from the creation of a captive include: 
 Direct access to reinsurance (wholesale) markets which would streamline the 
delivery of the products discussed previously and therefore reduce frictional costs 
 Quarantining of exposure to insurance products within a special purpose vehicle 
under the full control of the organisation 
 The creation of a risk management framework and culture within the organisation 
which could link with Best Management Practice (BMP) framework already in place 
to accommodate growers’ existing exposures. 
Discretionary Mutual Fund 
Another commercially proven mechanism to provide insurance-type protection to growers 
is by the establishment of a DMF.  An industry DMF could be established in a shorter 
timeframe and at a lower cost than a captive.  WTW has experience in establishing DMFs 
and has the requisite relationships with legal firms and taxation advisers to obtain 
clearance of all documentation and a tax opinion before submission of necessary 
paperwork to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). 
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WTW operates a global Captive Management Practice with operations in all key captive 
domiciles which has considerable experience in establishing and managing captives and 
DMFs for a range of client size and industry. 
The author recommends that priority be given under the DCAP 2 Project to investigating 
the benefits for growers of group buying power. 
Regulatory Issues 
Various regulatory frameworks apply to the concepts raised in this proposal.  WTW does 
not provide legal, tax or accounting advice but is nevertheless well versed in the 
insurance regulatory framework in Australia and other jurisdictions.  We have a strong 
relationship with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the 
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) and their counterparts around the 
world. 
Regulatory due diligence would therefore be an integrated component of all the work 
undertaken with industry bodies. 
Insurance Products Conclusion & 
Recommendations 
It is our view that the Queensland agricultural sector has an excellent opportunity to 
provide its farmers with protection against uninsured seasonal risks to crop production.  
It has been observed in the responses to the farm-level questionnaires carried out during 
the course of compiling this report that there remains unfulfilled demand for such 
protection to be made available.  The Australian agricultural sector in general and the 
cropping sector in Queensland in particular, is extremely highly exposed to production 
volatility as a result of weather risks. 
Index-based weather risk management contracts can be extremely simple in terms of 
their operation, transparency and settlement process.  The payments made from these 
contracts can be used to compensate for lost revenue or reimbursement of costs for 
almost any type of agribusiness weather peril.  The analytical and structuring 
undertaking to arrive at the most appropriate index and pay-out levels, in the interests of 
minimising basis risk, is however somewhat time consuming and labour intensive.  For 
this reason, we recommend extending the DCAP project to enable the development of 
the most appropriate offering to Queensland’s farmers. 
An important part of our analysis would also allow potential solutions to be presented to 
farmers and develop a range of products for a variety of crop exposures for different 
seasons and regions.  The examples used in this paper are a snapshot of the many 
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options that can be structured, and alternative pilot programmes should be considered 
for analysis and structuring. 
Our recommendation is that we work together to develop a pilot programme for a 
discreet set of exposures for a single cropping season.  This would not only allow Willis 
Towers Watson to more fully demonstrate the value and effectiveness of such products, 
but also minimise the up-front cost and complexity of the analysis.  Should the pilot 
programme gain acceptance from Queensland Farmers Federation’s member bodies, 
additional solutions can be tailored for other crops, perils and regions.   
A range of options, including multi-year and risk sharing versions, would be included in a 
detailed report produced from our analysis.  The opportunity to build on this pilot 
programme would seem to be substantial given the range of weather perils faced by 
farmers. 
Formal insurance market quotes for one or more of the options presented would then be 
sought from a range of highly-rated Australian and global insurers, reinsurers and 
specialist weather risk management underwriters. This would allow for sufficient 
competitive tension and counter-party security for such contracts.  Capacity in excess of 
$200m per contract is available from specialist markets and their supporting carriers.  
Internationally there are examples of Governments providing a partial insurance subsidy 
to reduce their financial exposure for any weather-related support. Whilst it is yet to be 
seen if this is a viable option for Australia, these types of initiatives should be thoroughly 
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8. Possible Policy Directions 
Agricultural production in Australia, particularly in Queensland, is subject to volatile 
weather and climatic conditions such as drought, floods, storms, frost and cyclones. 
These risks will pose increasing challenges for farmers, as it is predicted that climate 
change will increase the frequency and impact of such events. Further, the Australian 
farm sector experiences a higher degree of production risk than other sectors of the 
economy. 
It has been observed in the responses to the farm-level questionnaires completed while 
delivering this project that there is a demand for appropriate risk management tools 
(insurance) to be made available.  Key messages from farmer surveys are that current 
insurance products available to Queensland farmers (specifically, cotton and sugar cane 
farmers) may not address critical risks to the production and/or profitability of these 
systems and that farmers would prefer to have a more options when deciding on 
insurance products that meet their business needs.   
Government policy and investment can have large impacts on agricultural insurance. The 
South Australian, Victorian and New South Wales state governments have recently 
removed stamp duty from agricultural insurance, a positive and proactive step to drive 
agricultural insurance uptake. The Western Australian Government and New South Wales 
Government are also investing in weather station infrastructure to assist the agricultural 
insurance market.  
The level of premium is still a major concern for farmers. Effective policy decisions, 
coupled with self-supporting low cost products may be able to deliver attractive and 
affordable insurance products for farmers.   
Potential recommended products are climate index-based insurance for crops (e.g. 
sugarcane and cotton). The project has recommended index-based insurance products as 
it recognises the necessity for self-supporting low cost products. 
The project has shown the potential for more affordable insurance projects. However, in 
order to ensure product affordability, innovative mechanisms need to be identified to roll 
out index-based insurance products. This may involve investigating options of new funds 
‘such as discretionary mutual funds’ to roll out optimal insurance options. 
It may also be possible that farmers with the appropriate Best Management Practice 
(BMP) accreditation benefit through a premium rate discount. The effects that viable 
agricultural insurance would have on risk profiling of rural lending is another area that 
needs to be researched with government support. 
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Large parts of the agricultural sector are unaware of the potential benefits of agricultural 
insurance and its use as a risk management tool. Therefore, there is a need to educate 
farmers about the value of insurance, through shed meetings and one on one facilitated 
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10. Appendices 
Appendix A Questionnaire 
Drought and Climate Adaptation Programme 
Producing Enhanced Multi-Peril Insurance Systems 
 
 
Please note that all responses will be treated in confidence. 
If you cannot or prefer not to answer any specific question, this will be understood but your fullest support 
would be gratefully appreciated and will provide most useful contribution to this valuable initiative. 
 
 
GENERAL FARM INFORMATION 
  
Address of Farm:  
Latitude:  Longitude:  
Nearest weather station to 
farm is: 
 
Farm Size:  Irrigated:  Dry 
Land: 
 
Crop types grown: Cotton:  Sugarcane:  
Other  
 
Crop Yields: Year: Tonnes / Bales: 
   
   
   
   
   
 
Cost of Farm Production: Input: Cost per Hectare: 
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
Gross Revenue* Per Year: Total: Per Tonne / Bale: 
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Gross Margin* Per Year: Total: Per Tonne / Bale: 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
REGION CLIMATE PATTERN AND RISK DESCRIPTION 
   
Annual Rainfall:  mm* at Farm (if known)  
Vegetation Period 
Rainfall: 
mm* at Farm (if known)  
  
How often have you experienced dry seasons?  
 
Have you experienced severe drought? Yes  No  
If Yes, specify years of occurrence:  
 
 
Does drought influence significantly your production/profit? Yes  No  




Put risks in order of severity and importance and designate the most significant losses 
you have recently experienced (expressed as percentage of revenue): 
Lack of Rain at planting:   
Lack of rain during season:   
Lack of rain before harvest:   
Hail:   
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Fire:   
Frost (specify exact seasonal 
time): 
  
Overspray:   
Excess rain at harvest:   
Pests:   
Flood:   
Malicious damages:   
Prices:   
Marketing of crops:   
Mill or Gin breakdown:   
Other (please specify):   
■    
 
Designate the most significant losses you have recently experienced: (data cost as 




Do you expect the future threat posed by droughts will increase in the future to: 
Increase strongly  
Increase slightly  
Stay the same  
Decrease strongly  
 
How high on  a scale of 1-5 do you rate the probability of incurring a loss from …… in 
the near future: 
1 = not at all / 5 = certain 1  2  3  4  5  
 
RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS APPLIED IN FARM 
 
What risk management tools do you supply in your farm? 
Irrigation: Yes  No  
Special soil preparation technology: Yes  No  
If yes, please specify: _____________________________________________________ 
Soil testing and agronomic advice: Yes  No  
Soil moisture monitoring equipment Yes  No  
Special varieties: Yes  No  
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Special damage reducing equipment (fences, net etc.): Yes  No  
Insurance: Yes  No  
Future contracts: Yes  No  
Participation in any risk management system from government / bank / 
marketing company: 
Yes  No  
Industry BMP: Yes  No  
Sought information regarding current and future weather risks e.g. hail: Yes  No  
Other (please specify): _____________________________________________________ 
Out of the measures you mentioned above, do you recall the costs of employing the tools identified? 
 
Out of the measures mentioned above, on a scale of 1-5, how would you rate your capacity to 
implement such measures? 
1 = not at all / 5 = certain 1  2  3  4  5  
 
Out of the measures mentioned above, on a scale of 1-5, how would you rate the measures ability to 
limit negative impacts?  
1 = not at all / 5 = certain 1  2  3  4  5  
 
Did you employ one of the above mentioned measures after gaining 
insurance? 
Yes  No  
 
Did you employ one of the above mentioned measures after experiencing a 
drought? 
Yes  No  
 
Do you participate in Farm Management Deposit Scheme? Yes  No  
Does it really help you? Yes  No  
 
Which types of crop do you insure, if any? 
 
The main reasons why you buy insurance? 
 
What was the premium charged? And the coverage? 
 
Which risks are covered by your insurance policy? 
 
Which risks would you like to include additionally in your insurance policy? 
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What does not satisfy you in your insurance policy? 
The size of the premium: Yes  No  
Specific details:  
  
The size of the deductible: Yes  No  
Specific details:  
The degree of coverage (i.e. max compensation of $10,000): Yes  No  
Specific details:  
The variety of coverage (i.e. wheat only vs. wheat and corn): Yes  No  
Specific details:  
Ease of access to insurance: Yes  No  
Specific details:  
Claim processing time: Yes  No  
Specific details:  
Other: 
 
What price of any risk management tool is affordable for you? 
 
What would you prefer to insure – production cost, production value, income, nominated amount? 
 
What is your criteria for choosing an insurer or broker? 
 
What else do you insure on your farm (property, liability, etc.)? 
 
When buying insurance what is your primary concern in a product? i.e. the size of premium, degree of 
coverage, size of deductible 
 





What type of irrigation system do you have? 
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Where do you source your water? (e.g. ground, river, 
captured) 
 
Do you have an allocation amount? Yes  No  
Have you received a full allocation in the past 5 years? Yes  No  




WEATHER INDEX SOLUTIONS 
This section to be completed after comprehensive presentation of interviewers. 
     
Do you understand what weather index solutions are? Yes  No  
Do you understand what “basis risk” is? Yes  No  
Would you buy a weather index solution instead of or additionally to 
insurance? 
Yes  No  
Are you ready to buy a weather index solution 30 days before the start 
of season? 
Yes  No  
How would you prefer to receive an explanation about a weather index 
solution that is being offered? 
Yes  No  
 
Appendix B Measures of assessing risk  
Utility in this project is measured in terms of the revenue of the representative farmer in 
each location. The revenue of the farmer for a particular year is the product of the yield 
and price. The farmer is also interested in minimizing the variability associated with the 
revenue. In essence, the farmer’s utility is more complete when the variability of the 
revenue is also considered as in the usual mean-variance theory. That is, if an actuarially 
fair insurance contract reduces the risk of an expected utility maximizing farmer, the 
farmer will prefer the insurance. However, since the interest is in minimizing the downside 
risk, the standard deviation may not be appropriate (Estrada 2008). Estrada (2008) noted 
that, until recent years, scholars and practitioners have been using the variance 
minimization approach because they are more familiar with it when in actual fact the semi-
variance is a better measure of risk.  
 
2.1 Mean Root Square Loss  
In the finance literature, Markowitz (Markowitz 1952, Markowitz 1959, Markowitz, 1991, 
Markowitz, et al. 1993) noted that analyses that are based on the semi variance 
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minimization tend to produce better results than those based on the full variance because 
investors are interested in minimizing underperformance. According to Jin, Markowitz and 
Zhou (2006) the major limitation of the mean-variance measure is that it only measures 
volatility because it penalizes the upside deviations as much as the downside deviations. 
Hatt, Heyhoe and Whittle (2012) affirmed that the position of farmers as utility maximisers 
and downside risk minimisers is the same as those of other investors.  
Jin, Markowitz and Zhou (2006) presented two forms of semi variance analysis. The first 
form is the expected squared negative deviation from the expected value, also known as, 
the below-mean semi variance. The second is the expected squared deviation from some 
fixed value. The fixed value could be benchmarked as a zero return or another target value 
like the median or a given level of return. Several authors have alluded to the attractive 
features of the mean-target semi variance model as noted in Fishburn (1977, p. 116). The 
models in a portfolio context as put forward by Jin et al (2006, p.55) are as follows:  
The total return of the ith security during the period is a random variable ξi meaning that 
the payoff of one unit investment in security i is ξi units, i = 1, 2. . . , n. Suppose E(ξi) = 
ri and Var(ξi) < +∞.  
 








Subject to the constraints  ∑ xi = a
n
i=1     and  ∑ xiri = z
n
i=1      
where xi ∈ R represents the capital amount invested in the ith security, i = 1, 2, . ., n 
(hence x := (x1, . . . , xn) is a portfolio), a ∈ R is the initial budget of the investor, and z 
∈ R a pre-determined expected payoff. Here x−:= max (-x, 0) for any real number x. This 
problem is also referred to as below-mean semi variance model.  






ℇi −  b)
−]2 (2) 
 
        Subject to the constraint:  ∑ xi = a
n
i=1  
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Where b ∈ R represents a pre-specified target.  
The Mean Root Square Loss (MRSL) adopted by Vedenov and Barnett (2004) uses the first 
model presented above. Vedenov and Barnett (2004) used the MRSL as another measure 
of risk and it was found to be appropriate in this context because the minimization of the 
semi-variance rather than the full variance is of relevance since farmers are mainly 
interested in managing their downside losses like all rational investors. In this project, we 
intend to use the MRSL based on the mean since we expect farmers to be concerned with 
below average revenue. For different contracts (5th, 10th and 30th percentile contracts), 
the MRSL may be computed to observe the extent to which the downside risk below the 
mean is minimized. Hence, if the MRSL reduces with insurance, then the contract is efficient 
at that strike level or contract for that location.  
The revenue without contract is given by:  
 𝐼𝑡  =  𝑝𝑌𝑡 (3) 
and with contract is:  
 𝐼𝑡𝛼   =  𝑝𝑌𝑡 + β − θ (4) 
Where; It = revenue at time t without insurance, p = price of agricultural commodity, Itα 
= revenue at time t with alpha percentile level of insurance, Yt = yield at time t, βαt = 
insurance payout for that level of insurance in that year and θα = the yearly premium for 
that level of insurance and is constant throughout the years in question, MRSL is the Mean 
Root Square Loss without insurance and MRSLα is the Mean Root Square Loss with an 
alpha level of insurance. These values differ by location but a location subscript is not 

































2.2 Conditional Tail Expectation  
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Another measure of risk is the Value at Risk (VaR). The VaR emphasizes the maximum 
reduction in revenue that will not be exceeded at a given level of probability. In finance 
literature, the VaR is typically used to analyse the risk to portfolio returns because volatility 
does not discriminate between the downside and upside of the revenue distribution 
whereas, the VaR captures the downside risk at a given alpha level. The VaR could be 
estimated by historical method, variance–covariance method or with monte-carlo 
simulation.  The essence of calculating VaR is to assess the worst cases over a given period 
of time at a pre-specified level of probability. This method was adopted by Vedenov and 
Barnett (2004). However, VaR is not without its shortcomings.  
The VaR is considered incoherent and does not satisfy the required axioms of an 
appropriate risk measure (Acerbi & Tasche 2001). Therefore, the Conditional Value at Risk 
(CVaR) is preferred. Alternative names for CVaR are Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE) and 
Expected Shortfall (ES). The CVaR improves on the VaR because it captures the expectation 
beyond the VaR. In essence, while the VaR tells us that the farmer’s loss may not exceed 
a certain amount, the CVaR tells us about the expectation of the loss should the VaR be 
exceeded. Rockafellar and Uryasev (2002) also derived some fundamental properties of 
the CVaR that makes it a better measure of risk than the VaR. Some of these include 
coherence and stability.  
The CVaR analysis in this project is to be measured at the 5th, 10th and 30th percentiles. 
In essence, the expected revenue in the worst 2, 4 and 12 years in a 40–year period under 
both constant and variable commodity price assumptions are proposed to be analysed. The 
purpose of this analysis is to know whether or not insurance will increase the revenue of 
farmers in the worst two years of rainfall, the worst four years of rainfall and the worst 12 
years of rainfall in a 40-year period. If the contract is efficient, then the utility of the farmer, 
measured in terms of revenue, should increase in years when droughts are experienced. 
Should the contracts be triggered in years that did not match with the years of drought, 
the CTE decreases due to the deduction of the premium. Should the payout be equal to 
the premium every year when the contract was triggered, the farmer will be indifferent 
and if the payouts outweigh the premiums for those years, the farmer would have derived 
value from the insurance contract.  
Based on the work of Brazauskas et al. (2008, p. 3591), the CTE risk measure, or function, 
can be defined as follows: given a loss variable X (which is a real-valued random variable) 
with finite mean E[X], let FX denote its distribution function. Next, let FX−1  be the left-
continuous inverse of FX called the quantile function in the statistical literature. That is, for 
every t ∈ [0, 1], we have:  




−1 (𝑡)  =  𝑖𝑛𝑓 {𝑥: 𝐹𝑋(𝑥) ≥ 𝑡} (7) 
 
With the above notation, the CTE function is defined by; 
 




Some scholars have used these methodologies in the analysis of the efficiency of weather 
index insurance. In particular, Kapphan (2012) adopted both the VaR and the CTE in the 
analysis of optimal insurance contracts in Schaffhausen Switzerland. Vedenov and Barnett 
(2004) adopted the VaR, MRSL and Certainty Equivalence of Revenue (CER) in the analysis 
of a range of contracts designed for different crops at diverse locations in the US.   
2.3 Certainty Equivalence of Revenue  
The next risk measure we propose to use is Certainty Equivalence of Revenue (CER). Since 
the value and cost of shifting risk is derived from the tendency to be risk averse (Arrow 
1996) researchers have attempted to quantify this value in utility terms (Arrow 1964, 
Arrow 1971, Henderson & Hobson 2002). The value of the insurance therefore explains 
why an individual will be willing to pay an actuarially unfair price to have the insurance. By 
paying the actuarially unfair price, the individual has paid an additional premium for 
covering the risk. Hence, the individual may be able to pay the actuarially fair premium if 
the insurance is only reasonably valuable but may not be able to pay the actuarially unfair 
price if it is not much more valuable in terms of utility maximization and downside risk 
minimization.  
Based on experience, individuals who accept a price under a voluntary insurance scheme 
without subsidy creates interests not only for themselves but also for the insurer (Arrow 
1996). Therefore, a necessary condition for insurability is the willingness of the 
representative farmer to pay for an actuarially fair contract because the willingness to pay 
for a fair contract is a necessary but insufficient condition to pay for an unfair contract. A 
useful concept in the analysis of the utility of risky alternatives is an expression of the 
willingness to pay for a certain equivalence of the risky alternative. In this project, the CER 
of actuarially fair contracts was analysed. If the CER increases with the insurance contracts, 
then, the insurance contracts have made the farmer to opt for an additional value as a 
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certain equivalence implying that the contracts have added value to the revenue 
distribution of the farmer.  
There are different models that could be adopted in the context of individual’s risk aversion 
under the assumption that an individual is non-satiated. By non-satiation, the utility of 
X+1 > X. This implies that more revenue is preferred to less revenue. However, it should 
be noted that marginal utility of a unit increase in wealth may differ. In essence, an 
increase of a dollar for someone who owns no money is different from the same unit 
increase for someone who already owns $100. The individual with an initial wealth of $100 
may select a fair gamble on the $1 increase whereas the individual with a zero initial wealth 
may not be able to take as much risk but would prefer to have a certain equivalence of the 
increment. In this project, the implication of initial wealth is ignored by selecting a utility 
model that expresses certainty equivalence of revenue with assumptions that are 
compatible with the context of this project.  
Since the farmer prefers higher revenue and lower risk as modelled using the Conditional 
Tail Expectations and mean-semi variance, the logarithmic utility model of CER was 
adopted. This model assumes that the farmer is risk averse, prefers more to less and that 
the percentage of wealth invested into production is constant irrespective of changes in 
wealth (Elton et al 2003). The risk aversion of Australian farmers and the differences in 
their risk attitude have been well affirmed in literature (Bardsley & Harris 1991; Ghadim & 
Pannell 2003; Khuu & Weber 2013). It was assumed that the representative farmer in each 
shire exhibits a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) (Henderson & Hobson 2002). 
Kapphan (2012) similarly assumed CRRA in the analysis of optimal weather insurance 
contracts for a region in Switzerland. However, the model adopted in this project is less 
complicated than Kapphan (2012). Quiggin and Chambers (2004, p. 249) has shown that; 
In some applications, the additive functional form associated with the expected-
utility model proves useful as a simplifying assumption, but for most purposes the 
assumption of risk-aversion is sufficient to permit a simple and informative 
analysis. 









Where all variables are as defined earlier.  
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The three models, Conditional Tail Expectations (CTE), Mean Root Square Loss (MRSL) and 
Certainty Equivalence of Revenue (CER) are used to assess the efficiency of the crop 
insurance contracts. The impact of the insurance will be analysed by finding the percentage 
difference between the revenue of the farmer without insurance and with insurance at 
different strike levels. The percentage difference if positive for CTE and CER implies that 
the contract will be efficient whereas a negative difference implies efficiency for MRSL since 
the objective of the contract is to reduce the downside risk of the farmer’s revenue.  
 
1.4 Measurement of diversifiability of a portfolio of crop insurance premia  
 
The Loss Ratio (Lt) is the ratio of the indemnity paid to premiums collected. Pooling the 
premiums and indemnities across different shires and over time helps to examine the 














                                                                                        (14) 
 
















                                                                                        (15) 
 
П=Indemnities, P = Premium, L = locations, τ = time (the pooling could be based on 1, 2, 
5 and 10 years). 
If Lt is lower than 1 (Lt<1) , it indicates that the premium collected is more than the 
indemnities paid and therefore the insurer makes a profit, when it is 1 (Lt = 1), it implies 
a breakeven in that the indemnities paid is exactly equal to the premium and when it is 
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above 1 (Lt >1), it means that the insurer experienced a loss for that period in that 
indemnities paid is more than the premium collected (See Chantarat 2009 pp. 108 – 110).  
 
